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This thesis deals with market-based ways to measure risk and aggressiveness
at banks. It has been written during the course of my PhD studies from
September 2007 to December 2010 and was thus heavily influenced by the
global financial crisis, which started with the subprime crisis in the summer
of 2007. At first, the subprime crisis was deemed to be a local problem of the
U.S. housing market, but the financial globalization soon resulted in spillovers
and contagion around the globe. While most people agree that there was no
single factor that caused the crisis, there is still a lively debate about which
factors did actually contribute to it. Most candidates revolve around the
U.S. housing bubble, particularly in the subprime market, corporate as well
as household risk taking, monetary policy with low interest rates and the
search for yield, or financial market factors like product innovation, product
complexity, credit ratings agencies, regulatory avoidance, the shadow banking
system or simply executive compensation and bonuses (see, for example,
Geithner (2008), Hellwig (2008), Brunnermeier (2009), or Taylor (2009)).
No matter what the exact factors were, the recent experience has high-
lighted again that relying on traditional balance sheet information to infer a
bank’s exposure to a crisis has its drawbacks. Earlier work by Laeven and
Majnoni (2003) has shown already that banks delay provisioning for loans
until cyclical downturns have already set in. Huizinga and Laeven (2009)
also examine the recent crisis1 and find that banks overstate the value of
distressed assets especially during the crisis period. In addition to this bank
1Huizinga and Laeven (2009) use data until the end of 2008.
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discretion during crisis periods, it has also been well documented that banks
strategically manage the reporting of their loan loss data in general2. Apart
from the bank discretion balance sheet information has several other draw-
backs. It is mostly backward looking in nature and misses other important
information (for example, information in analyst reports or a bank manager’s
reputation). Combined with a low frequency of publication and a rapidly
changing business environment, it implies that accounting data cannot re-
flect new information readily. This has proven to be particularly detrimental
during the crisis times of 2007 and 2008 and has inspired me to investigate
market-based alternatives in the three chapters of this thesis.
Market-based measures of bank risk have the potential to remedy the
drawbacks of accounting data since the prices they are build on are inher-
ently forward-looking and available at higher frequencies. Moreover, they
are not under the discretion of banks and they condense several sources of
information into one measure so that they offer the market’s perception of a
bank’s business situation. This different view of a bank’s business situation
may help supervisors or regulators, for instance, to inform themselves about
the riskiness of a bank.
The development of the financial crisis over the last three years has
strongly influenced the chapters of this thesis. At first, one of the main
problems was to identify and quantify credit risk at banks since it was not
obvious which banks faced a large exposure to subprime loans or structured
products based on subprime loans. The first paper is thus concerned with
a new method to estimate a bank’s credit risk exposure that incorporates
traditional as well as non-traditional sources of credit risk. Since it is market-
based it may give supervisors and regulators a different opinion on a bank’s
credit risk exposure that is not influenced by the bank itself. Moreover, it is
forward-looking and available at shorter frequencies.
The proposed method in chapter two makes use of information impounded
in bank share prices by exploiting differences in their sensitivity to default risk
news. In the empirical implementation I identify default risk news as changes
in the spreads of a high and a low risk credit default swap (CDS) index. For
this I assign high and low risks to subinvestment grade and investment grade
2See, for instance, Wall and Koch (2000) and Hasan and Wall (2004).
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indices, respectively. The two indices can then be used to estimate share
price sensitivities. From these sensitivities one can in turn derive a bank’s
credit risk indicator (CRI), which is defined as the ratio of a bank’s high-risk
sensitivity to its total (high-risk plus low-risk) sensitivity. Loosely speaking,
the CRI thus measures the share of high risk exposures in a bank’s portfolio,
as perceived by the market.
I estimate CRIs for the 150 largest U.S. bank holding companies. I find
that the CRIs are positively and significantly related to measures of loan
riskiness, such as the share of non-performing loans or loan-loss allowances.
They are also positively related to factors that are often considered to proxy
high loan risk, such the interest income on loans. Moreover, banks with a
higher share of real estate loans seem to have significantly higher CRIs, which
is consistent with the notion that a large part of the problem loans at banks
were in the form of mortgages.
Since the CRI is a measure of credit risk quality, it may be a useful
predictor of bank performance in downturns. This is because in a downturn
the default risk of high-risk borrowers increases by more than the default
risk for low-risk borrowers. Banks with a higher CRI should thus suffer
relatively more. When testing this prediction using the subprime crisis I find
that the CRIs are able to forecast bank failures and share price performances,
even after controlling for a variety of traditional asset quality and general risk
proxies. Lastly, I also find that the BHCs’aggregate CRI has not deteriorated
since the beginning of the subprime crisis. This suggests that the market was
aware of their (average) exposure to high risk credit. The decline in bank
share prices during the subprime crisis should hence be attributed to market
updates about the default risk of high and low risk loans itself (showing
in a widening CDS spread for subinvestment grade and investment grade
exposures) and not to updates about the composition of the BHCs’exposures
to either category.
Over the course of the financial crisis, the spillovers to other financial
institutions and the real economy became more apparent. Especially after
the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 the attention broadened
from credit risk to systemic risk in general. Since then also the public eye
has paid more attention to systemically relevant banks, and too-big-to-fail or
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too-connected-to-fail banks. Although systemic risk is not necessarily equal
to tail risk, this development inspired the second paper in which banks’
exposure to a large downturn in the economy (measured by the S&P500) is
measured and investigated.
In this chapter a bank’s (systemic) tail risk is defined as its exposure to a
large negative market shock. I measure this exposure by estimating a bank’s
share price sensitivity to changes in far out-of-the-money put options on the
market, correcting for market movements themselves. As these options only
pay out in very adverse scenarios, changes in their prices reflect changes in the
perceived likelihood and severity of market crashes. Banks that show a high
sensitivity to such put options are hence perceived by the market as being
severely affected should such a crash materialize. As this sensitivity reflects
perceived exposures to a hypothetical crash, it is truly forward-looking in
nature.
Based on this methodology tail risk exposures of U.S. bank holding com-
panies are estimated. I find that the estimated exposures are inversely related
to their CAPM beta. This finding is interesting as it suggests that banks
that appear to have a low exposure to the market (at least in normal eco-
nomic times) actually tend to be the banks that are most exposed to crashes.
Moreover, I also compare this measure to the tail risk beta3, which is a com-
mon measure of bank tail risk. I find that both measures provide different
information since they are fairly uncorrelated. A potential explanation for
this lies in the backward-looking nature of the tail risk beta and its reliance
on large daily share price declines.
I also use my methodology to characterize the main drivers of bank tail
risk. Understanding these drivers is important for regulators as it gives
them information about which activities should be encouraged and which
not. The findings suggest that traditional banking activities such as, for in-
stance, lending are associated with lower perceived tail risk. However, several
non-traditional activities, namely securities held for-sale, trading assets and
derivatives used for trading purposes are perceived to contribute to tail risk.
Interestingly, securitization, asset sales and derivatives used for hedging are
not associated with an increase in tail risk exposure. This indicates that a
3Note, that the tail risk betas are obtained through quantile regressions.
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transfer of risk itself is not detrimental for tail risk, but that non-traditional
activities that leave risk on the balance sheet are. On the liability side I
find that leverage itself is not related to tail risk but that large time deposits
(which are typically uninsured) are. I also find that perceived tail risk falls
with size, which is indicative of bail-out expectations due to too-big-to-fail
policies.
The difference between the second paper and the systemic risk measure-
ment literature is that the methodology proposed in chapter three is applied
to all listed banks in the economy while the systemic risk measurement lit-
erature typically focuses on the most important banks in a financial system
as only those can make a significant contribution to systemic risk (see, for
instance, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) and Huang et al. (2010)). The
contribution to the tail risk measurement literature lies in the forward-looking
nature of the proposed methodology, which does not require the actual ob-
servation of a tail event to calculate a bank’s exposure to it. In addition, this
tail risk measure is also able to capture prolonged downturns in the economy
over several weeks whereas other existing measures typically rely on shorter
declines in the stock market within a few days.
Apart from the measurement of bank risk, the behavior of banks in terms
of loan supply and loan pricing is also of interest in light of the recent crisis.
This is because past crises have shown that banks often react to troubled loan
books with credit rationing, which may have a negative impact on the real
economy. However, instead of examining the supply of credit, the third paper
focuses on the pricing behavior of banks, which is a different dimension of a
bank’s loan policy. This is because the pricing policy may give a more timely
indication of changes in a bank’s loan policy. When a bank is becoming
less eager to make a loan, it may not always be possible to directly reduce
the loan amount, due to, for example, informal commitments or reputational
concerns. However, it may be possible to react through the pricing channel.
In perfectly competitive loan markets without any frictions the pricing of
a loan should represent the borrower’s underlying risks and thus be mainly
determined by borrower and loan characteristics. In reality, however, credit
markets exhibit various frictions such as, for instance, asymmetric informa-
tion, imperfect competition, and legal constraints. As a result banks have to
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screen and monitor borrowers and may gain bargaining or market power vis-
à-vis borrowers. This market power may lead to deviations from the effi cient
pricing rule that is based on the borrower and loan characteristics.
The third paper studies the part of the loan pricing that is not related
to borrower and loan characteristics. In particular, I regress the loan spread
of a syndicated loan on borrower and loan characteristics. The residual of
this pricing regression is averaged over all borrowers at the bank level and
is called pricing aggressiveness. It represents the part of the loan spread
that cannot be explained by borrower or loan characteristics but instead by
a bank’s characteristics. Factors that influence these characteristics include,
for example, bank credit supply conditions, the general bank strategy, and its
risk appetite. This implies that aggressiveness may differ from a bank’s risk-
iness, which is often used as a key variable in the regulatory and supervisory
process. A bank with a growing risk appetite, for instance, may decide to
focus lending more on riskier borrowers. Aggressiveness, on the other hand,
may change even when the risk characteristics of the loan portfolio remain
the same. It thus represents a different dimension of bank behavior. Given
that changes in aggressiveness may have implications for the soundness of
a bank, a proper understanding of banks’aggressiveness should be in the
interest of supervisors and regulators. In addition, changes in a bank’s loan
policy may be detected more timely in the aggressiveness measure than in a
bank’s loan growth, which is reported on its balance sheet.
The paper in chapter four thus investigates the pricing behavior of large,
international lead arrangers in the syndicated loan market. I document that
banks differ in their pricing aggressiveness over time and relative to each
other. Among top 10 lead arrangers a difference of 50 basis points can be
observed for most years of the sample. Similarly, the difference between the
ten most and ten least aggressive lead arrangers is around 150 basis points
throughout the sample. Over time, the aggressiveness of banks and their
cross-sectional dispersion varies considerably. Business cycle movements do
not seem to be related to the time series variation, except for the last years in
the sample when the subprime crisis hit the world economy. The paper also
examines the relationship between aggressiveness and balance sheet items of
banks. I find that higher loan loss provisions in the last year lead to less
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aggressiveness in the syndicated loan market suggesting that banks react to
a weaker loan book by adjusting their pricing of loans. In addition, I find
that aggressiveness is related to future changes in balance sheet items. This
suggests that aggressiveness can be used by supervisors or regulators as a
leading indicator for changes in the loan book.
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Chapter 2
The Credit Risk Indicator
2.1 Introduction
It is of great value to the financial system to have informative and com-
prehensive indicators of the quality of banks’assets. Such indicators allow
supervisors and regulators to monitor general trends in the financial system.
They also permit them to identify weak banks and to put them under in-
creased scrutiny. For example, many of the banking failures during the crisis
of 2007-2009, and their systemic ramifications, could have presumably been
avoided if the high-risk nature of the investments at some banks had become
apparent at an earlier stage. Easily accessible information about the quality
of banks’investments is also crucial for bank shareholders and debtors. It
allows them to assess the performance of bank managers and to better eval-
uate the risks to which banks are exposed. This, in turn, enhances effi ciency
at banks by exposing their managers to greater market discipline.
Unfortunately, such indicators are diffi cult to obtain. Banks’ business
is complex and wide-ranging. In particular, due to the variety of inform-
ation required in judging the riskiness of their lending activities, there do
not exist good measures of the quality of their loan portfolios. In order to
obtain proxies of loan quality one typically relies on accounting data, such
as, for example, the share of non-performing loans in a bank’s portfolio, or
the ratio of loan-loss allowances to total loans.1 These proxies have a range
1See, among others, Berger and DeYoung (1997), Wheelock and Wilson (2000), Hub-
bard, Kuttner and Palia (2002), DeYoung (2003) and Kwan (2003).
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of shortcomings. For one, the scope of accounting data is limited. They miss
important information (such as that contained in analyst reports or in the
form of informal knowledge, e.g., a bank manager’s reputation). They are
also mostly backward looking in nature, while ideally one would like to have
a measure of a bank’s future risk. The low frequency of publication of ac-
counting data also means that these proxies cannot reflect new information
readily. The reliance on accounting-based data also suffers from the problem
that loan-quality data is to a large extent at the discretion of banks them-
selves.2 This is especially a concern if investors or supervisors base their
decisions on such data. The construction of appealing indicators of asset
quality is also complicated by the fact that banks nowadays undertake a
variety of activities that expose them to credit risk. Beside their traditional
lending business, banks trade in credit derivatives, take part in complex se-
curitizations or grant credit lines. Many of those activities are off-balance
sheet. And even if banks report them, and do so systematically, it is diffi cult
to condense them into a comprehensive measure.
In this paper we develop a new method for measuring a bank’s credit
portfolio quality. Rather than using balance sheet data, this method is based
on the information impounded in banks’share prices. The general appeal
in using share prices is that they represent the market’s overall assessment
of a bank, and thus reflect a wide range of information. Our basic idea for
how information about credit quality can be extracted from share prices is
the following. Suppose that there are two types of loans in the economy,
high-risk and low-risk loans, and suppose a bank’s portfolio contains mostly
high-risk loans. That bank’s share price should then react relatively strongly
to news about changes in the default risk of high-risk loans, but less so to
news about low-risk loans. Thus, the bank’s relative share price sensitivity
to either type of news gives information about the perceived quality of its
loan portfolio.
In our empirical implementation we identify default risk news as changes
2There is widespread evidence that banks strategically manage the reporting of their
loan loss data (see Wall and Koch (2000) for a survey of U.S. evidence and Hasan and Wall
(2004) for international evidence). There is also evidence that banks delay provisioning
for loans until cyclical downturns have already set in (Laeven and Majnoni (2003)) and
that they overstate the value of distressed assets (Huizinga and Laeven (2009)).
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in the spreads of a high and a low risk credit default swap (CDS) index.
For this we assign high and low risks to subinvestment grade and investment
grade indices, respectively. The two indices can then be used to estimate
share price sensitivities. From these sensitivities one can in turn derive a
bank’s credit risk indicator (CRI), which is defined as the ratio of a bank’s
high-risk sensitivity to its total (high-risk plus low-risk) sensitivity. Loosely
speaking, the CRI thus measures the share of high risk exposures in a bank’s
portfolio, as perceived by the market. It thus presents a simple market-
based alternative to the risk-weights currently used to compute regulatory
capital requirements, which either rely on crude risk categories (standardized
approach of Basel I) or assessments generated by the bank itself (advanced
approach of Basel II).3
We believe that this measure has several attractive features. Since it
is market-based, it is forward looking and can incorporate new information
quickly. It is also a comprehensive measure of a bank’s credit quality. For
example, for a bank’s CRI it does not matter whether the bank acquired
a high-risk exposure via lending to a low quality borrower, or by writing
protection on a low quality underlying in the CDS market, or by buying a
junior tranche of a Collateralized Loan Obligation. Another advantage of the
CRI is that it is based on the market’s assessment of the bank, and not on
the bank’s assessment of itself. It is thus more diffi cult to manipulate.
We estimate CRIs for the 150 largest U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs).4
We find that their CRIs display substantial variation. Among the ten largest
surviving BHCs, for example, Citigroup has the largest CRI, implying that
it is considered as having relatively worse exposures. Interestingly, Citigroup
is up to now also the bank that has incurred the largest write-downs in the
subprime crisis. We also analyze the evolution of the BHCs’aggregate CRI
over time which allows us to track perceived credit quality at the BHCs.
We find that during our sample period (February 2006 until March 2010)
the aggregate CRI was surprisingly stable. In particular, it did not increase
between February 2007 (when problems with subprime loans first materi-
alized in the financial system) and the height of the subprime crisis. This
3We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this use of the CRI.
4The full list of CRIs can be found at http://lyrawww.uvt.nl/~wagner/cri.xls.
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suggests that the market was aware of the BHCs’overall high-risk exposures
prior to the crisis. The decline in bank share prices during the subprime
crisis should hence be attributed to market updates about the default risk of
high and low risk loans itself (showing in a widening CDS spread for subin-
vestment grade and investment grade exposures) and not to updates about
the composition of the BHCs’exposures to either category. This is an inter-
esting finding as it indicates that there was not a general market failure in
anticipating risks in the financial system but rather that the market did well
in recognizing risks in one dimension (bank exposures to high risk credits)
but not in another (a general worsening of default risks in the economy).
We next address the question of how a bank’s CRI is related to traditional
measures of asset quality. We find that the CRIs are positively and very
significantly related to measures of loan riskiness, such as the share of non-
performing loans or loan-loss allowances. They are also positively related to
factors that are often considered to proxy high loan risk, such the interest
income on loans. We also find that banks with a higher share of real estate
loans have significantly higher CRIs, which is consistent with the notion that
a large part of the problem loans at banks were in the form of mortgages.
As a measure of credit risk quality, the CRI may be a useful predictor of
bank performance in downturns. This is because in a downturn the default
risk of high-risk borrowers increases by more than the default risk for low-
risk borrowers. Banks with a higher CRI should thus suffer relatively more.
We test this prediction using the subprime crisis. For this we first use the
CRI to dynamically predict bank failures during the subprime crisis. We
find that the CRI is able to predict failures at a one and a two quarter
horizon. This predictive power survives when we control for a variety of
other variables, such as various proxies of loan quality, bank leverage, share
price beta and distance-to-default. Next we study whether the CRI can
also predict share price performance of banks during the subprime crisis.
For this we regress a bank’s share price change in the year following June
2007 (the time when problems with subprime loans became a widespread
phenomenon) on its CRI estimated using information before this date. We
find a significant and negative relationship between the bank’s CRI and its
share price performance. The relationship again survives both in significance
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and magnitude if we include the other controls. For both forecasting exercises
we also find that traditional measures of asset quality do not explain very
well banks’performance during the subprime crisis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section
reviews the related literature. In Section 2.3 we explain our methodology
for estimating the CRI. The section also contains a general discussion of the
CRI. Section 2.4 contains the empirical analysis. The final section concludes
and briefly discusses uses for the CRI.
2.2 Related Literature
In recent years there has been a growing interest in using market-based in-
formation to measure bank risk (for surveys, see Flannery (1998) and Flan-
nery (2001)). This is on the back of evidence suggesting that the market
does well in evaluating the risks at financial institutions. The existing liter-
ature suggests that investors are able to distinguish between banks based on
their exposures to certain types of risks or asset compositions. This is true
for share prices (see, for instance, Flannery and James (1984a), Sachs and
Huizinga (1987) and Smirlock and Kaufold (1987)) as well as for bond and
subordinated debt spreads (see, for example, Flannery and Sorescu (1996),
Morgan and Stiroh (2000), and Hancock and Kwast (2001)). There is also
evidence that market information has predictive power for banks, being it
forecasting of bank performance (Berger, Davies and Flannery (2000)), rat-
ing changes (Evanoffand Wall (2001), Krainer and Lopez (2004), and Gropp,
Vesala and Vulpes (2006)) or default (Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2006)).
Spurred by the crisis of 2007-2009, there has recently been a focus on
developing market-based measures of system-wide risk. In an earlier contri-
bution, Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2006) develop a framework for systemic
risk assessment using market data to separate systemic risk into contagion
risk and correlated exposures. Acharya et. al. (2009) propose the Mar-
ginal Expected Shortfall (MES) as a systemic risk measure. This measure is
defined as the loss by an institution when the market is in its left tail and
is estimated from share price data. Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) construct
a measure of systemic risk in the financial system based on probabilities of
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default and correlations that are estimated from asset prices.
While our approach also captures system-risk (in that we measure expos-
ures to economy-wide credit risk), it differs from these measures in that it
focuses on the asset side of banks (to our best knowledge, the CRI is the first
market-based measure that quantifies asset risk at banks). The CRI also
differs conceptually from these, and other market-based measures. Market-
based measures of bank risk, such as the distance-to-default or CDS spreads,
typically tell us the perceived proximity of a bank (or a set of banks) to
default at a given point in time. By contrast, the CRI measures the exposure
of a bank to an economic downturn (in which high risk assets perform worse
than low risk assets). It is hence particularly useful for identifying in advance
banks that are vulnerable to downturns in the economy. For example, in the
years prior to the crisis of 2007-2009, the risk of a downturn was perceived
as low. Market-based measures of bank defaults (such as CDS spreads or the
distance-to-default) consequently indicated a low probability of default at
the time. However, banks had already accumulated high risks at this point
(and our empirical results suggest that the market was aware of this) and
hence were perceived as vulnerable in terms of their CRI.
In our empirical implementation we use changes in indices of CDS spreads
to identify variations in economy-wide credit risk. CDS spreads have the
advantage that they are a relatively clean and effi cient measure of default
risk. For example, there is evidence that a substantial part of price discov-
ery takes place in these instruments (see Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005)
and Norden and Weber (2009)). There is also evidence that lending-relevant
credit risk information is first revealed in CDS markets, before it is incorpor-
ated in other markets (Acharya and Johnson, 2007) or in ratings (Norden,
2009). CDS markets also did not seem to lose their informational role during
the subprime crisis (which is important for our analysis as our sample covers
the crisis period). For example, Eichengreen et. al. (2009) show that CDS
prices can be used to understand how risks are spreading among banks dur-
ing the crisis. King (2009) provides evidence that the value of government
rescue packages is reflected in CDS spreads.
In part of our analysis we relate estimated share price sensitivities to
bank balance sheet variables. Such an approach has also been followed in
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the literature that studies the interest rate sensitivity of bank share prices.
The typical procedure in this literature is to estimate in a first step share
price sensitivities to interest rate changes, and in a second step to relate these
sensitivities to balance sheet information. For example, Flannery and James
(1984a) show that interest rate sensitivities are related to proxies of maturity
mismatch at banks, while Flannery and James (1984b) show that sensitivities
depend on the composition of banks’balance sheets. Hirtle (1997) finds that
they are also related to derivative usage at banks. Our paper follows a similar
methodology and finds that default risk sensitivities of bank share prices are
as well related to balance sheet characteristics.
The forecasting exercises in the second part of the paper also relate our
work to a strand of the asset pricing literature that has used credit indices
to forecast aggregate stock returns (e.g., Fama and French (1989), Fama
(1990), Schwert (1990)). The approach in our paper differs in that we do
not use credit spreads themselves for forecasting. Rather, we estimate share
price sensitivities to credit spreads and use these sensitivities as a proxy
for how banks will fare in a downturn. This approach also sets us apart
from another important strand of the asset pricing literature which estimates
factor loadings and studies whether assets with different factor loadings have
different required returns (e.g., Cremers (2002)).
2.3 The Credit Risk Indicator
Consider a prototypical balance sheet of a bank. On the asset side we have
securities (S) and loans (Loans). On the liability side we have debt (D) and
equity (E), with equity being the residual claim (E = S + Loans −D). In
terms of market values (V (.)), we can thus write
V (E) = V (S) + V (Loans)− V (D). (2.1)
We express all variables in unit of shares. V (E) is simply given by the bank’s
share price. V (D) can be approximated by its book value (discounted at an
appropriate interest rate). For the loans, we have to take into account the
risk of default. The expected loss on a loan EL is given by EL = PD ·LGD,
where PD is the probability of default and LGD is the loss given default
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(expressed as a share of the face value). We assume that there are two types
of loans, high risk and low risk loans. The amounts due on each type of loan
are denoted with H and L, respectively, and we have ELH > ELL. The
value of the loan portfolio can then be expressed as
V (Loans) = H(1− ELH) + L(1− ELL). (2.2)
We define the Credit Risk Indicator (CRI) as the share of high risk loans





We use as a proxy for the expected losses on high and low risk loans the
spreads of two (economy-wide) Credit Default Swaps (CDS) indices (these
indices are discussed in greater detail in Section 2.4.1). CDS spreads provide
a fairly clean measure of default risk since they represent the compensation
the market requires for taking on credit risk. This is because the writer of
the CDS has to be compensated by the buyer of protection for the expected
loss on the underlying credit (consisting of the product of PD and LGD).
The price of a CDS (which is expressed as a spread) hence approximates the
expected loss. We can thus write for the CDS prices of high and low risk
exposures
CDSH = ELH and CDSL = ELL. (2.4)
In our empirical work, CDSH and CDSL will be the prices (spreads) of a
CDS-index consisting of a representative sample of subinvestment grade and
investment grade exposures in the economy.
The CRI can be obtained as follows. We can first write equation (2.1) in
terms of changes
4V (E) = 4V (S) +4V (Loans), (2.5)
where 4 indicates the (absolute) change from t− 1 to t and where we have
assumed constant debt.5 We can replace V (Loans) in (2.5) with the ex-
pression derived earlier and approximate the change in the value of a bank’s
5Since debt changes occur only infrequently, assuming constant debt is a reasonable
approximation for regressions that are on a daily frequency. In addition, a bank’s debt
changes cannot be contemporaneously correlated with (aggregate) CDS spread changes
(as there is a signficiant decision and implementation lag associated with debt changes)
and hence their omission should not bias the CDS estimates.
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security portfolio with the change in a market index, denoted M . Given se-
curity holdings of S, the absolute change is then given by 4V (S) ≈ 4M S
M
.
We hence have for the change in the bank’s share price:6
4p = S
M
4M −H 4 CDSH − L4 CDSL. (2.6)
We can then estimate the following relationship at the bank level
4pi,t = αi + βi4Mt + γi4 CDSHt + δi4 CDSLt + φi4 Zt + εi,t, (2.7)
where i denotes the bank, t denotes time, and Z is a vector of control vari-






We can hence obtain the CRI by first estimating γ̂i and δ̂i, and then applying
(2.8).
2.3.1 Discussion of the Properties of the CRI
In deriving the CRI we have presumed that a bank’s credit risk derives ex-
clusively from loans. Banks, however, also have credit risk exposures from
other investments. Since the CRI is derived from share price sensitivities to
credit risk in general (and not specifically loan-risk), it captures those as well.
The CRI should hence be interpreted as a measure of the overall riskiness of a
bank’s credit exposures. For example, a bank may have a large CRI because
it has sold credit protection on a risky borrower using CDS or because it
has a risky bond portfolio (consisting of, for instance, mainly subinvestment
grade names). Credit exposures may also arise from banks’ securitization
activities. For example, in a Collateralized Loan Obligation (CLO) banks
typically sell the lower-risk senior and mezzanine tranches, but retain the
high risk equity tranche (these tranches are typically unrated but perceived
6Note that the equivalent of (2.6) with relative changes does not hold. Dividing (2.6)





. Hence, for a
given loan portfolio H relative changes in the CDS spread (4CDS
H
CDSH
) would only translate
into relative share price changes (4pp ) when
CDSH
p is constant over time.
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to be well below investment grade). This lowers the average quality of the
bank’s credit exposures and increases a bank’s CRI. By contrast, if a bank
were to acquire AAA-rated (super-senior) tranches from securitizations, its
average credit risk exposure may improve and hence its CRI would decrease.
The CRI will also reflect the effect of risk mitigation techniques, such as
through collateralization of loans. If, for instance, a bank has a large number
of high risk loans, but at the same time these loans are fully collateralized,
its share price should not be sensitive to news about high risk loans. The
bank’s estimated CRI will then be low and hence reflect that its high risk
exposure is effectively small.
In our empirical implementation of equation (2.6) we will include a market
index that has been orthogonalized with the CDS indices. The consequence of
this is that our estimated sensitivities do not only capture the direct effect of
changes in the CDS indices on bank equity, but also an indirect effect because
variations in default risk may influence bank equity through changes in the
market return.7 In the same way as, say, the high risk CDS index proxies
for changes in the value of high-risk credit exposures of banks, changes in
the market index triggered by changes in the high risk CDS index proxy
for high-risk equity exposures of banks (more precisely: for equity exposures
to firms with high default risk). The estimated CRI will hence reflect the
overall share of high risk exposures at banks, coming both from debt and
equity holdings. This is important for using the CRI as an indicator for how
banks will perform in a downturn. In a downturn, both equity and debt of
high (default) risk firms will suffer relatively more than for low risk firms.
Banks that have a large exposure to high-risk firms are thus expected to
perform worse, regardless of whether the exposure comes through debt or
equity. By not including the indirect effect, the CRI would thus miss a part
of the exposure. This issue is probably less important for our study since
U.S. banks have low equity holdings of firms, but might be crucial when
estimating CRIs on international banks.
We have assumed that banks have either high or low-risk exposures, which
in our empirical implementation we take to be representative subinvestment
7This point has been shown formally by Giliberto (1985) in the context of share price
sensitivities to interest rates (rather than CDS spreads)̇.
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and investment grade exposures (as given by the two respective CDS indices).
Banks have, however, a variety of credit exposures, which will obviously not
all fall neatly into these two categories. The CRI is thus not strictly the share
of a bank’s subinvestment grade exposures, but should be more generally in-
terpreted as a measure of the average riskiness of a bank’s credit exposures.
Suppose, for example, that a bank has a loan portfolio that consists only of
loans that have risk characteristics just between the representative invest-
ment and subinvestment grade loan. The banks’share price should then (on
average) react similarly to subinvestment and investment grade CDS spread
changes. Hence the bank’s CRI would be 1
2
(which is the same as for a bank
whose loan portfolio consists of equal parts of subinvestment and investment
grade exposures) even though the bank has no real subinvestment expos-
ures at all. Moreover, since the representative investment and subinvestment
grade exposures in the CDS index are not representing the lowest and highest
possible credit risk in the economy, a bank’s CRI is also not constrained to
lie between zero and one. For instance, a bank that mainly has exposures of
a higher quality than the representative investment grade credit in the CDS
index will have a CRI smaller than zero, while banks with a portfolio quality
below the representative subinvestment grade will have a CRI greater than
one.
While ideally we would like to measure share price sensitivities to a bas-
ket of exposures consisting of all credit types (i.e., commercial, real estate,
consumer, ...), CDS indices for such baskets do not (yet) exist. By contrast,
CDS indices are readily available for corporate exposures, for which there also
exist high and low risk baskets. In our empirical implementation we will thus
measure sensitivities to corporate credit spreads. Credit spreads, however,
will be correlated across exposures (for example, in an economic downturn
default risks typically increase for all loan types). Hence our estimated CRI
will also (at least partially) capture other credit types. In addition, high risk
exposures are likely to be correlated within the bank: a bank that follows an
aggressive strategy is expected to simultaneously extend high risk corporate
and high risk real estate loans (this is confirmed by our empirical finding that
the CRI is positively related to real estate exposures at banks). Neverthe-
less, if broader CDS indices become available they should be used to improve
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estimation of the CRI.
It should be emphasized that the CRI measures the relative sensitivities
to high and low credit risk, that is, it relates to the composition of the bank’s
credit exposure. It should hence not be confused with a bank’s absolute
sensitivity to credit risk. The latter will be determined, besides the compos-
ition of the credit portfolio itself, also by the size of its credit portfolio and
its leverage. For example, all else being equal, the share price of a highly
leveraged bank will be more sensitive to changes in credit conditions than is
the case for a bank with lower leverage.8
Since the CRI is derived from share prices, it represents the market’s as-
sessment of banks’credit risk. This assessment will be based on a variety
of information, including for instance accounting data and analyst forecasts.
However, as the subprime crisis has reminded us, banks are opaque institu-
tions.9 Hence, it should be kept in mind that the CRI is the equivalent of the
market’s “best guess”of a bank’s portfolio credit quality, and may hence dif-
fer from its true quality.10 Moreover, even though share prices may contain a
wide range of useful information, they may arguably also be subject to noise.
An advantage of our empirical implementation is that it computes CRIs from
daily share price responses over a longer period of time (1025 trading days
in our sample). The impact of any noise in returns is likely to cancel out
over so many observations and thus its influence on the CRI is likely to be
limited. Another advantage is that the CRI relies on sensitivities, and not
on share price levels. If there is, for example, a bubble due to (unjustified)
optimism about credit risk, this will affect the bank’s valuation, but not its
8Note also that a high CRI is not necessarily a sign of bad management if the bank
is adequately compensated for the risk. Nevertheless, a high CRI bank is of concern to
regulators since this bank would be more vulnerable to downturns (the bank should equally
also profit from a boom but this is of less interest to regulators as they mainly care about
downside risk).
9Whether banks are more opaque than other institutions remains a debated issue. Mor-
gan (2002) finds that there are more rating disagreements for banks, suggesting higher
opacity. Flannery, Kwan and Nimalendran (2004), by contrast, analyze market micro-
structure properties (such as bid-ask spreads) and find no evidence that banks are less
transparent than similar non-financial firms.
10An observed change in a bank’s CRI thus does not necessarily imply that the bank has
actually altered its credit portfolio, but may also be due to new information that causes
the market to re-evaluate the credit quality of a bank. We return to this point later in
Section 2.4.2 when we consider the evolution of banks’CRIs.
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responsiveness to credit risk. It should also be kept in mind that we measure
relative share price sensitivities. Thus, even if there is some mispricing which
affects the absolute response to credit risk news, it is diffi cult to conceive how
such a mispricing might alter the relative response to high and low risk credit
news.
The fact that the CRI measures relative sensitivities also means that our
analysis is not affected if the value of bank equity does not change one-to-
one with changes in the value of the bank’s loan portfolio. While equation
(2.1) implies that ∂V (E)
∂V (Loans)
= 1, this will for instance not be the case under
the Merton-model due to the option value of equity. Sensitivities will then,
for example, also be influenced by the bank’s asset risk. In Appendix A
we show that this does not affect the estimated CRI. The reason is that if
∂V (E)
∂V (Loans)
6= 1 (and possibly also bank dependent) each CDS sensitivity will
be scaled by the same factor ( ∂V (E)
∂V (Loans)
). Hence this effect cancels out when
we compute relative sensitivities, and the estimated CRI will still measure
the true share of high risk loans.
Another issue is that CDS spreads may not only reflect credit risk. This is
even though CDS prices are typically considered to be a relatively clean meas-
ure of credit risk (as opposed to bond spreads, for example). In fact, recent
research has suggested the existence of other pricing factors in CDS spreads,
such as liquidity and risk premia (see, e.g., Amato (2005) and Bongaerts, de
Jong and Driessen (2009)). If CDS prices move because of news unrelated
to credit risk, this may result in the absolute share prices responsiveness to
credit risk being underestimated. However, this is less of a concern in our
case since this will be the case for both high and low credit risk and hence
the CRI is not necessarily affected.
2.4 The Empirical Evidence
2.4.1 Data
We estimate CRIs for U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) that are classified
as commercial banks and listed in the U.S.. We exclude foreign banks (even
when listed in the U.S.), pure investment banks and banks for which complete
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data was not available. Of the remaining banks, we take the 150 largest ones
by asset size.
We collect daily data on bank share prices, two CDS indices (to be dis-
cussed in more detail below), short-term and long-term interest rates, and
a market return from Datastream and the FRED database. Additionally,
various balance sheet data are collected from the FR Y-9C Consolidated
Financial Statements for BHCs. The sample ranges from February 01, 2006
to March 05, 2010. The starting point of the sample was determined by the
availability of reliable CDS data.
For the high and low risk CDS index we take the “Dow Jones CDX North
America Crossover” index (“XO index”) and the “Dow Jones CDX North
America Investment Grade” index (“IG index”). These indices are jointly
managed by the Dow Jones Company, Markit and a consortium of market
makers in the CDS market and are considered the leading CDS indices for
North American underlyings. The IG index consists of 125 equally weighted
U.S. reference entities with ratings ranging from BBB up to AAA. These
reference entities are the most liquid entities traded in the CDS market and
represent large companies in various industries. The XO index consists of
35 equally weighted U.S. reference entities that have ratings ranging from B
up to BBB (hence the term crossover, as it also represents credit risk on the
border to investment grade quality). The reason why this index has fewer
reference entities is not known to us but is likely to be due to the fact that
there are less (liquid) CDS of such underlyings.
Taken together, both indices cover a large part of the overall rating distri-
bution (from AAA to B). We checked the distribution of loans by U.S. banks
since 2000 using the Dealscan database (which contains syndicated loans)
and found that the share of rated loans outside this range only 2%. Thus
the two indices seem to capture a large part of the relevant risk profiles. It
should be noted that the indices also contain financial institutions, which is
desirable for our purpose since banks may also grant loans to other banks.11
Both CDS indices are expressed in basis points (bps) of spreads. A higher
11An alternative to using CDX indices is the ABX index (which covers subprime mort-
gage loans). However, our aim in this paper is to estimate a general credit risk indicator,
and not one that is tailored to the crisis of 2007-2009.
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spread implies a higher cost of hedging credit risk, and hence a higher implied
default risk. The XO-index thus should have a larger spread as it represents
riskier underlyings: during our sample period its average spread was around
280 bps, compared to around 120 bps for the IG index. In addition, as typical
in crises, the spread widens during the subprime crisis (from around 100 bps
in the beginning of 2007 to up to 400 bps at the height of the crisis).
The indices are available for different maturities, ranging from one to
ten years. We focus on the 5-year maturity index, which is the reference
maturity for CDS contracts. The indices are rolled over twice a year (that is,
the constituent’s list is checked and adjusted if necessary) and assigned a new
roll number. We always use the newest roll (“on-the-run”), as this is the most
liquid one. When changing between different rolls, the underlying reference
entities may change as well (typically, between 6-9 entities are replaced from
one roll to another). This may cause a jump in the index unrelated to a
change in credit risk in the economy. The average CDS price change (in
absolute terms) on rollover days is 9 bps for the IG-index and 28 bps for the
XO-index. These changes seem large and we hence include dummy variables
for the rollover dates in our econometric analysis (however, our results are
essentially invariant to their exclusion).
For our main regression (equation 2.7) we use the following variables. For
the control variables Zt (which capture proxies for discount rates that might
affect V (D) and possibly V (Loans)) we include a short term and a long
term interest rate (the 1-month and the 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity
Rate) and an inflation-proxy (the difference between the 10-Year Treasury
Constant Maturity Rate and the 10-Year Treasury Inflation-Indexed Security
at Constant Maturity). For the market return, we take the S&P 500. We
orthogonalize the S&P 500 return with both CDS indices in order to include
only the part of the market movements that are unrelated to changes in credit
risk. As discussed earlier, this has the effect of attributing any indirect effect
of CDS spreads on bank values (through changes in the market index) to the
CDS sensitivities.
The CDS-indices themselves will also be correlated. This may result in
their individual regression coeffi cients being not reliably estimated. We hence
orthogonalize the CDS prices on each other. This effectively attributes the
24 CHAPTER 2. THE CREDIT RISK INDICATOR
common component of credit risk changes to either the high or the low credit
risk, depending on the chosen direction of the orthogonalization. A direct
consequence of this will be that the importance of the risk type (high or low)
to which the common factor is allocated will be overestimated. However,
this not a problem for our analysis since we are mainly interested in how
CRIs differ across banks. This ranking should not be influenced by the
orthogonalization method since the bias it may introduce affects the CRIs of
all banks. We have verified this by computing the CRIs under either method
of orthogonalization: their correlation across banks is near one (ρ = 0.95)
and the rank-correlation is equal to one. For the regressions reported in
the paper, we decided to orthogonalize the IG-spread (thus, we include only
IG-spread changes unrelated to changes in the XO-index).
2.4.2 The Aggregate CRI
Before turning to the estimation of the bank-specific CRIs, we first analyze
their aggregate CRI. For this we run a pooled version of equation (2.7).
Specifically, we estimate the following regression on daily data:






t + φ∆Zt + εi,t,
(2.9)
where pi,t is a bank’s share price, S&P500
(orth)
t the orthogonalized S&P 500
index, CDSXOt the XO CDS index, CDS
IG(orth)
t the orthogonalized IG CDS
index, and Zt the vector of control variables. In addition we also include
dummies for each day on which either the IG or the XO-index is rolled
over. We exclude day-bank observations at which a stock was not traded in
order to reduce the impact of illiquidity in bank stock prices. Note that all
variables are expressed in absolute changes, consistent with the derivations
in Section 2.3. This implies that banks with higher (average) share prices
will also tend to have larger changes. In order to avoid issues arising from
this, we normalize each bank’s share price by its mean (the results, however,
are essentially invariant to this normalization).
Table 1, column 1, contains the regression results. All variables have the
expected sign and are significant. In particular, the two variables of interest,
∆CDSXO and∆CDSIG(orth), are highly significant and have the correct, that
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is negative, sign. The second but last row in the table reports the implied
CRI, as computed from equation (2.8), which is 0.1557. As discussed earlier,
the absolute level of a CRI on its own is not informative since it is influenced
by the orthogonalization method. However, we note that the CRI is quite
precisely estimated: the last row in the table shows that the 95% confidence
interval for the CRI (computed using the (non-linear) Wald-Test) is between
0.1510 and 0.1603.
It is, however, informative to study whether the aggregate CRI has changed
over time. For this we split our sample into three equal parts and estimate
separate CRIs for each subsample (cutoff dates are June 08, 2007 and Oc-
tober 20, 2008). The results are reported in the last three columns of Table
1. One can see that the sensitivities in each subsample are still precisely
estimated. The implied CRIs are similar but seem to exhibit a downward
trend (0.1879, 0.1637 and 0.1289).
We next look at the evolution of the CRI in more detail. For this we use
rolling window and recursive window analysis. Figure 1 shows the coeffi cients
of the aggregate CRIs of the rolling and recursive windows over the entire
sample period. The rolling window uses a window-length of 240 trading days
(roughly equal to one calendar year), which is the same as the initial length of
the recursive window. For both methods the coeffi cients are plotted against
the last day of the windows. Looking at the rolling window first, one can
see that the aggregate CRI is relatively stable over time, except for three
periods: February 2007, July/October 2007 and September 2008/February
2009. During these periods the CRI fluctuates widely but stabilizes itself
afterwards close to (or a bit below) its previous level.
One may suspect that these periods of instability are due to noise inherent
in daily data. We have thus re-estimated the CRI using weekly data. How-
ever, the rolling windows were virtually unchanged and the precision of the
CRI estimates even declined (the confidence intervals widened). The reason
for these fluctuations in the CRI rather lies in the fact that these periods
are associated with major turbulences in financial markets. The first period
(February 2007) coincides with the time at which first warning signs about
large losses connected to subprime lending emerge (on February 22 HSBC
fires the head of its US mortgage lending business as losses reach $10.5bn;
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the largest US house builder DR Horton warns of huge losses from subprime
fall-out (March 8), and shares in New Century Financial, one of the largest
subprime lenders in the US, are suspended on March 12 due to fears that it
might be heading for bankruptcy). The second period (Summer/Fall 2007) is
typically considered as the time where subprime problems become apparent
on a wider scale. It starts with Bear Stearns bailing out two of its funds
exposed to the subprime market for $3.2bn (June 22). Various European
and American banks also revealed further large losses connected to subprime
mortgages. In addition, global stock markets fall dramatically and interbank
money markets dry up. The third period (September 2008/February 2009),
where the CRI fluctuates more moderately, coincides with failure of Lehman
brothers and the subsequent financial turmoil.
One may conjecture that the estimation of the CRI was obscured during
these periods because they were considered by large and erratic swings in
both bank stock prices and CDS prices. This is confirmed by the standard
errors of the estimated of CRIs for the first two periods: while the median
standard error of a CRI in a rolling window is about 0.005, the standard
error reaches 0.05 in the first trouble period and 0.07 in the second. The
CRIs in these periods are hence not precisely estimated. This suggests that
regulators should only take seriously changes in CRIs when this does not go
along with a loss of precision.
The third period, however, is different. The standard errors are only
slightly elevated in this period. In addition, the CRI seems to decline during
this period, which is somewhat unexpected. The reason for this is, however,
of purely mechanical nature: this is the point where data with high estimated
CRIs (summer 2007) falls out of the window. This is confirmed by looking
at the recursive window, which does not show a substantial decline in the
CRI over this period but rather suggests that the CRI was constant. The
observation that the CRI did not increase during the Lehman failure is eas-
ily explained by the fact that the Lehman failure itself was not driven by
worsening credit portfolios but rather by liquidity and counterparty issues.
The recursive window also shows a slight (but persistent downward) trend
in the CRI since March 2008. This is consistent with the fact that after 2007
most banks clean up their loan portfolio by writing off bad loans. Since
2.4. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 27
the majority of these loans were high risk in nature, this implies that their
portfolio composition (that is, the CRI) shifted to better quality. Note also
that the CRI has been rather stable since mid 2009, the time when conditions
in the financial system started to stabilize. Going forward we would expect
the downward trend in the CRI to continue as banks further write-down bad
loans and are probably less inclined to extend new high-risk loans. However,
once banks have repaired their balance sheets they may want to again increase
their risk-taking and hence their CRIs may increase.
Looking at the overall evolution of the CRI as represented by the recursive
window, a striking observation is that the CRI did not jump to (permanently)
higher levels since the beginning of the sample period. This suggests that
the market was (on average) aware of the BHCs’ exposures to high risk
investments well before the subprime crisis (otherwise we should have seen a
significant increase in the CRI). This finding is interesting given that bank
share prices declined significantly during the subprime crisis, which shows
that not everything has been anticipated. In our context, there are two
reasons why share prices can fall systematically. The first is an update about
the proportion of high to low risk loans while the second is an update about
the default risk associated with each of the loan categories. The fact that the
CRI did not deteriorate since the start of the crisis suggests that the update
was on the latter and not the former dimension.12 This is also consistent
with the fact that the CDS spreads of high and low risk borrowers increased
substantially during the crisis. Thus, the market seems to have been aware
of the exposures of banks but did expect a downturn that increases default
risks on either loan type.
2.4.3 Individual CRIs
We now turn to the analysis of the BHCs’ individual CRIs. For this, we
estimate equation (2.9) on the bank level. That is, we estimate for each
12Obviously, there have been updates about individual bank’s exposures. Our results
only say that there is no net effect for the average bank.
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The significance of the credit exposure estimates is generally high. For all
except three banks the joint credit exposure γi + δi is significant at the 5%
level (we look at joint exposure since insignificance of either exposure may
simply mean that the bank has little exposure to this type). In most cases
significance is also very high; the average t-statistics exceed 10 (in absolute
values).
Using equation (2.8), we can then compute for each bank its CRI from
the estimated γi and δi. Table 2 reports some summary statistics. The
mean CRI across all 150 banks is 0.1670, which is similar to the previously
estimated aggregate CRI, 0.1557. The (cross-sectional) standard deviation
of the CRIs is 0.0561. The lowest CRI among the banks is 0.0546, while the
largest CRI takes the value of 0.4132.
Figure 2 depicts the individual CRIs, where banks have been ordered by
asset size. Most banks have a CRI in the range from 0.1 and 0.2. There
are outliers but only relatively few (it turns out that among the seven banks
with a CRI of above 0.3, two actually failed). From the ten largest surviving
BHCs, Citigroup (the last dot) has the highest CRI. Interestingly, Citigroup
is up to now also the bank with the largest accumulated write-downs during
the subprime crisis. Besides, no obvious pattern can be detected from the
figure. It is, however, reassuring that there is substantial cross-sectional
variation in the CRIs, suggesting that the market differentiates across banks
in terms of credit risk sensitivities.
2.4.4 The CRI and Other Measures of Bank Risk
In this section we study whether (and how) a bank’s CRI is related to tradi-
tional measures of loan quality, and proxies of bank risk more generally. In
the first place this will first inform us about whether the CRI really captures
credit risk. It may also help us to understand whether the CRI contains
information about general lending risk, or applies only to specific segments
of lending. In addition, we will also relate the CRI to some basic bank char-
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acteristics; this may inform us about how the CRI depends on the business
model of banks.
The simplest way to study how the CRI is related to other bank variables
is to look at the correlation between the estimated CRI and these variables.
However, this is not an effi cient procedure since information from the first
step (the estimation of the CRIs itself) is then not fully used in the second
step (computation of the correlations). In particular, the precision with
which the CRIs are estimated differs across banks and one would like to give
banks with less precisely estimated CRIs a lower weight in the second step.
In addition, the two step procedure also causes the problem of generated
regressors (see, for example, Pagan, 1984).
We instead develop a method which allows us to (effi ciently) estimate the
relationship in one step.13 For this we adjust the equation for the aggregate
CRI (2.9) in order to allow the CDS-sensitivities to depend on a bank char-
acteristic, say variable X. More specifically, we include in the regression for
each CDS-spread an interaction term with X, where X is expressed relative
to its sample mean (X̃). We thus estimate the following regression:
∆pi,t = α + β∆S&P500
(orth)
t + (γ + η(Xi − X̃))∆CDSXOt
+(δ + θ(Xi − X̃))∆CDSIG(orth)t + φ∆Zt + εi,t. (2.11)
Note that if the coeffi cients for the interaction terms are zero (η = θ = 0),
this equation is identical to equation (2.9). The CRI is, as before, given
by the ratio of the estimated high-risk CDS-sensitivity and the total CDS
sensitivity. Analogous to equation (2.8), this is
CRI(X) =
γ + η(X − X̃)
γ + η(X − X̃) + δ + θ(X − X̃)
. (2.12)
Differentiating equation (2.12) with respect to X and evaluating at the mean





13Note that our setup differs from the usual two-step regression problem in that the
variable of interest that is estimated in the first step (the CRI) is a (non-linear) combination
of coeffi cients, and not simply a coeffi cient itself.
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CRI ′(X)X=X̃ is the counterpart of the coeffi cient on X in a two-step re-
gression where in the second step the CRIs (estimated in the first step) are
regressed on X . The relationship between the CRI and a variable X can
thus be estimated as follows. We first estimate (2.11). From the coeffi cients
we then calculate the coeffi cient for X, CRI ′(X)X=X̃ , using equation (2.13).
Whether the relationship is a significant one is then determined by carrying
out a (non-linear) Wald-test of ηδ−θγ
(δ+γ)2
= 0.
Table 3 shows the estimated relationships between the CRI and various
balance sheet variables (which are for the purpose of these table averaged over
the entire sample period). Note that Table 3 essentially reports a number
of univariate relationships since we run (2.11) for each variable and then
compute its relationship with the CRI.
The first four variables in the table are traditional measure of banks’loan
risk: non-performing loans, loan-loss provisions, loan-loss allowances, and net
charge-offs (all four scaled by total loans). They all have the expected sign
(positive) and are significant at the 1% level. Thus, banks whose balance
sheet indicates that they have a lower loan quality also have a higher CRI,
that is they are perceived by the market as having riskier exposures. We also
note that these results represent strong and consistent evidence that the CRI
captures general credit risk.
The next four variables represent common proxies of asset risk. The first
variable considered is the bank’s ratio of total risk-weighted assets to total
assets, which turns out to be positively and significantly related to a bank’s
CRI. The second variable is loan growth, which has been found to explain
asset risk at banks (see Foos, Norden and Weber (2010)). The idea behind
this proxy is that a bank which wants to expand its loan volume quickly,
presumably has to do so at the cost of accepting lower quality borrowers. This
would suggest a positive relationship between loan growth (computed as the
average loan growth over the sample period) and the CRI. The point estimate
is indeed positive, however, the relationship is not significant. The next
variable is the ratio of interest income from loans to total loans. This variable
has a positive and significant relationship with the CRI. This is according
to expectations as banks will tend to charge higher rates on riskier loans. A
high interest rate income may hence indicate a risky loan portfolio. Finally,
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we consider a bank’s return on assets (ROA). The a priori relationship of this
variable with the CRI is ambiguous. On the one hand, banks may charge
higher rates on riskier loans. On the other hand, riskier borrowers are also
more likely to default. In addition, banks with poor management may have
simultaneously risky loans and low profitability. The table shows that there
is a negative and significant relation with the CRI. Thus the market perceives
banks with high profitability to have a relatively safe loan portfolio.
The next set of variables contains three basic characteristics of banks’
balance sheets: leverage, loan-to-asset ratio and size. First, it can be seen
that there is a positive and significant relationship between a bank’s leverage
(as measured by the debt-to-asset ratio) and its CRI. An explanation for this
may be different risk preferences at banks: a bank which follows a high risk
strategy may jointly choose a high-risk loan portfolio and operate with high
leverage. Note that since the CRI is a relative credit risk sensitivity, there
is no mechanical relationship between the CRI and leverage which may arise
from the fact that (everything else being equal) highly leveraged banks are
more sensitive to changes in loan values. The same argument also applies
to our next variable, the loan-to-asset ratio. This variable is found to be
positively related to the CRI. A possible explanation for this relationship is
similar to the loan growth argument. If a bank expanded its loan portfolio
aggressively in the past, it might have been forced to compromise on the
quality, thus leading to a positive correlation between the loan-to-asset ratio
and high risk exposures. The last of the basic balance sheet characteristics
we consider is size, measured by the log of total assets. We find that larger
banks tend to have a lower share of high risk exposures. There are various
interpretations of this. For one, small banks may simply operate in riskier
local markets. It may also be that large banks have better risk management
techniques, thus allowing them to reduce lending risk. Finally, there may
also be difference in risk preferences among small and large banks.
The last two variables in Table 3 are a bank’s share of real estate loans and
a dummy for whether the bank securitizes such loans. The former variable is
positively and significantly related to a banks’CRI. Hence banks with more
real estate lending are perceived by the market as having worse credit portfo-
lios. This result is consistent with the experience of the subprime crisis, which
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was driven by high risk mortgages. It also suggests, as discussed previously,
that the CRI captures lending risk beyond corporate loans (which make up
the CDS indices). Regarding the securitization dummy: we do not find that
this variable is significantly related to lending risk as perceived by the CRI.
This may indicate that securitization has two opposing effects on securitiz-
ing banks themselves. On the one hand, securitizing real estate loans may
directly reduce high risk exposures at these banks. On the other hand, these
banks may use the freed-up capital to extend new loans (for a theoretical
analysis of this effect, see Wagner (2007) and Wagner (2008)). These loans
are presumably riskier, for example, due to the incentive problems created
by the securitization business.
It is an interesting question whether the established associations between
the CRI and other bank variables are due to information unique to the CRI,
or whether this information is already contained in standard measures of bank
risk that can be generated from the stock market index. To test this, we re-
run the above regressions controlling for bank betas. The results (not shown
here) are almost identical to ones in Table 3, both in terms of coeffi cients
and significance (the only noteworthy difference is that total risk weighted
assets are now only significant at the 10% level). This suggests that the CRI
captures information that is not already contained in risk measures obtained
from the stock market index.
2.4.5 Using the CRI to Predict Bank Failures
The last section has shown that the CRI is related to various balance-sheet-
based risk proxies. Naturally, the question arises if the CRI has informational
value beyond these proxies. One way to test this is to see whether the CRI has
predictive power in forecasting bank failures, controlling for other measures
of bank risk. This would make the CRI an appealing indicator for regulators
and supervisors. This section thus studies the forecasting ability of the CRI
during our sample period. This period is well suited for such an exercise as
it comprises the subprime crisis during which there were many bank failures.
The first step is the identification of failed banks. We start with the failed
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bank list of the FDIC14 and take all failed commercial banks that belonged to
one of our 150 bank holding companies. There are seven of such banks. In six
out of seven cases the commercial bank’s BHC also went bankrupt following
the failure of its commercial bank. We thus identify six failed BHCs. To these
we add two rescue mergers (Wachovia and National City) as these two BHCs
would have very likely failed if they were not taken over with the direct help
(Wachovia) or indirect help (National City) of the government or the Federal
Reserve. This gives us a total of eight BHCs for our empirical analysis. A
first inspection of their CRIs shows that the CRI may be useful in identifying
bank failures: the average CRI of these banks one month before failure was
0.24 (compared to a sample mean of 0.17).
The empirical analysis is carried out by means of probit regressions. In
each quarter the dependent failure variable takes the value of one if a bank
fails in this quarter, while surviving banks are assigned a zero. Failed banks
are dropped from the sample after the quarter of failure. Failure is then
(dynamically) predicted using information one (or two) quarters prior to
failure. Our sample starts with the start of the subprime crisis (second
quarter of 2007) and ends in the last quarter of 2009. We estimate the
following relationship
Fi,t+k = p(CRIi,t,Zi,t), (2.14)
where F is the bank-specific failure indicator, Z denotes as set of controls and
k = {1, 2} denotes quarters. We do not include bank fixed-effects because
for all surviving banks there is no variation in the dependent variable and we
would thus only look at variations within the group of failing banks. Note
that (2.14) is based on quarterly variables. In some cases (this applies to
the balance sheet variables) we did not yet have the data for the end of our
sample. We then simply use the last available data. Note also that the CRI
that is used as an explanatory variable in this regression is itself an estimated
parameter. This may cause issues known as “generated regressor problems”.
However, we argue in Appendix B that in our specific setting these problems
are unlikely to be important.
Table 4 reports the results for various sets of control variables. Panel A
14Available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html
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contains the results for the two quarter forecasting, while Panel B the results
for the failure forecasting by one quarter. Column 1 in each panel reports
the regression without controls (thus only including the CRI). In column 2
we include traditional measure of loan risk. In columns 3 and 4 the CRI is
tested alongside proxies for asset quality and general bank characteristics, re-
spectively. Column 5 controls for real estate activities. The share price beta
(estimated from separate regressions with only a non-orthogonalized stock
index included) and the Z-score are considered in columns 6 and 7, respect-
ively. Finally, column 8 reports the results when all controls are included.
Column (1) shows that the CRI is significant (at the 5% level) in explain-
ing failures at both forecasting horizons, and is so with the expected (positive)
sign. The coeffi cients are similar for both horizons, indicating stability of our
specification. Across the different specifications in columns (2)-(8) the CRI is
always significant for two quarter forecasting. For the one quarter forecasting
the CRI is significant in all regressions, except in column (4), which includes
leverage and bank size (note, however, that in the regression considering the
full set of controls (column 8) the CRI is again significant, albeit weakly).
Focusing on the control variables, one can see in column (2) that the non-
performing loans and the net charge-offs are only marginally significant in
Panel A. The non-performing loans also have a counter-intuitive sign (which
might be due to multicollinearity issues among the loan risk proxies). In
Panel B, the net charge-offs turn insignificant while the non-performing loans
increase in significance but again with a negative sign. In both panels column
(3) shows that the return on assets is the only significant control variable and
is so with a negative sign. Among the basic balance sheet characteristics in
column (4) leverage and size are significant with a positive sign at both
forecasting horizons. The results for leverage confirm the perception that
many of the problems during the crisis of 2007-2009 were related to excessive
debt-taking at banks. The size result is interesting, however, it should be
noted that it is not very robust (when we exclude leverage, for example, size
becomes insignificant)
Column (5) shows next that real estate loans only weakly relate to bank
failures. This is surprising since real estate was at the root of the crisis,
but the explanation may be that risk information coming from real estate
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exposures is already subsumed in the CRI. In addition, we can also see that
the dummy for the securitization of real estate loans has no prediction power
as it is insignificant in both panels. Column (6) shows the regression with the
share price beta included. It can be seen that for each time horizon the beta is
not significant (while the CRI remains significant). This finding suggests that
the information contained in the CRI has forecasting power that is superior
to measures obtained from the stock market index. Column (7) includes the
Z-score as a control variable. The Z-score turns out to be highly significant
in forecasting failure. This is expected since, by construction, it is designed
to represent proximity to failure. However, for each time horizon we can
see that the CRI stays significant. The CRI thus contains information that
can forecast bank failures beyond the information contained in the distance-
to-default measure. We have also tested a Merton-based distance-to-default
measure as an alternative to the Z-score (not reported); the results are very
similar but are a bit weaker for the one-quarter horizon.
Besides the CRI level, changes in a bank’s CRI may potentially also con-
tain information about failures. We thus have redone all regressions including
the quarterly change in the CRI alongside the CRI (not reported here). The
result is that these CRI changes are almost always insignificant, and when
they are significant they are only weakly so and have the wrong sign (neg-
ative). The results for the CRI, however, do not change. These findings are
consistent with our priors in that what should ultimately matter is the bank’s
current level of risk, and not how it changed relative to previous quarters.
Besides for our sample of BHC, we also do forecasting regressions for
a wider set of banks. We started again from the failed bank list of the
FDIC, which gives us in total 208 U.S. commercial banks that failed during
our sample period. From these banks we exclude banks that have assets
of less than one billion USD, which reduces the sample to 43 banks. From
these banks we lose 18 since they are not listed on any stock exchange. We
lose another 9 because either their shares very illiquid or their bank holding
company survived the failure of the commercial bank. This leaves us with
16 failures, of which 6 are already included in our original sample of 150
large BHC. Adding the two rescue mergers gives us 18 bank failures. Their
mean CRI one month before failure is 0.30 (comparing to a sample mean of
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0.17). As for some of these banks we were not able to get all the balance
sheet data (some banks are registered as Thrifts and have hence different
reporting requirements) we focus in this exercise on probits with the CRI
and the distance-to-default measure only.
Table 5, Panel A and B, contains the results. Column (1) in each panel
shows the results with only the CRI included. The CRI turns out to be pos-
itively and very significantly related to future bank failures. The coeffi cients
are very similar to the ones obtained for the smaller set of banks. Column (2)
reports results with the Z-score included (the results for the Merton-based
distance-to-default are similar). The Z-score is significant with the correct
sign at the one-quarter horizon but insignificant at the longer forecasting
horizon. The CRI is still significant and its coeffi cient even increases.
The marginal coeffi cients for the CRI are about 0.05 for both horizons.
This implies that if a bank has a CRI that is 0.1 higher than its peers (for
comparison, recall that the mean CRI is 0.167 and the standard deviation is
0.06), its probability of failing in the next quarter is 0.05x0.1=0.5% higher.
Hence, over the entire sample period (which consists of 10 quarters), this
means that the bank has a 5% higher chance of failing, which we consider to
be economically significant.
The results from the larger set of banks corroborate our earlier findings
that the CRI has significant power in predicting bank failures. The results
notably even holds when controlling for measures that are designed to capture
proximity to failure, namely the distance-to-default measures.
2.4.6 The CRI and Banks’Share Price Performance
During the Subprime Crisis
In this section we address the question whether the CRI also has predictive
power for the performance of banks during the subprime crisis, as measured
by their share prices. The idea is the following. As discussed earlier, a
high CRI is not necessarily a bad sign for bank management as long as the
bank gets adequately compensated for the risk through higher interest rates.
However, if there is an unexpected downturn in the economy, banks with
higher CRIs should be harder hit since high risk exposures perform relatively
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worse when economic conditions deteriorate. Thus high CRI banks should
see their share price decline more during the subprime crisis than low CRI
banks.
In this section we thus study whether a bank’s CRI prior to the crisis
relates to its performance in the crisis. For this we consider again the same
set of controls as in the previous section. In particular we are estimating the
following cross-sectional regression:
perfi = α + βCRIi + γZi + εi, (2.15)
where perfi is a bank’s share price performance from June 15 2007 until June
15 2008, CRIi is a bank’s CRI calculated using information only up until June
15, 2007, and Zi is the vector of control variables already discussed before.
This time this vector is however constrained to information before June 15,
2007.
Table 6 reports the results using the same partitioning of controls as in
Table 4. The main message is that the CRI is significantly and positively
related to subprime performance and that this result is robust to the consid-
eration of various controls. In fact, the CRI is always significant at least at
the 10% level, but is mostly so at the 5% or 1% level. Its coeffi cient is also
relatively stable, ranging from -13 to -22. The size of the coeffi cient suggests
that the relationship is economically relevant. A coeffi cient of -20, for ex-
ample, implies that an increase in a bank’s CRI by 0.1 is associated with a
share price performance that is 7% worse than its peers.15 This is noteworthy
since the subprime crisis was not only a crisis of asset quality but was also
driven by liquidity and funding issues. It also confirms the expectation that
in periods of crises (regardless of their origin) banks with lower asset quality
should be significantly more affected.
We also note that the significant control variables have the expected signs.
Among the traditional loan risk measures and proxies for asset risk (columns
(2) and (3)), the loan loss allowances, and the interest income from loans
both have a negative sign, suggesting that banks with a higher share of bad
15This number is obtained by transforming the absolute share price decline implied by
a CRI change of 0.1 (=-20x0.1=-2) into a relative share price decline using the sample
share price mean (=28.44).
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credits suffered more during the subprime crisis. In column (4) we can see
that banks with a higher loan-to-asset ratio experienced a higher share price
decline. We can also see that larger banks performed worse as well, consist-
ent with the notion that it was mainly those banks which engaged heavily
in real estate securitization activities. This interpretation is confirmed by
the results reported in column (5), which shows that banks with more real
estate loans, and banks that securitize those loans, perform relatively worse.
Column (6) shows that the share price beta is not significant. This confirms
previous findings which suggested that the information contained in the CRI
has forecasting power that is superior to measures obtained from the stock
market index. Column (7) shows (contrary to the failure analysis in Table
4) that the Z-score has no predictive power.
Finally, column (8) reports the results when all control variables are in-
cluded. Besides the CRI, only two of the fifteen control variables are signific-
ant at the 5% level. This confirms the importance of the CRI in explaining
the subprime performance. We note that, in particular, all traditional loan
risk proxies are insignificant. The only controls that remain significant are
bank size and the share of real estate loans. These two are factors that
played a specific role in the current crisis but are not general measures of
bank risk. This is different from the CRI, which is not construed to reflect
characteristics of the crisis.
Taken together, the analysis of the share price performance during the
subprime crisis confirms our priors that the CRI measures exposure to an eco-
nomic downturn and thus allows to predict how banks fare if such a downturn
sets in.
2.5 Concluding Remarks and Discussion
In this paper we have developed a new measure of the quality of banks’
credit portfolios. This measure is not restricted to the potential losses from
defaulting loans but captures also credit risks from other sources. It includes
exposures arising from a variety of bank activities, such as securitizations
and credit derivatives. Since it is derived from market prices, it comprises
information from a wide range of sources and can, moreover, reflect new
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developments quickly. The credit risk indicator (CRI) is arguably also an
independent assessment of banks’risks since it should be diffi cult for banks
to consistently manage their share price sensitivities.
The CRI is a natural indicator of how well banks might perform in periods
of a worsening of credit risks in the economy. Indeed, we have found that the
CRI could forecast the performance of banks during the subprime crisis. The
CRI may thus be used by bank supervisors, alongside with other informa-
tion, as a criterion for identifying potentially exposed institutions well before
a downturn materializes. By contrast, as we have discussed in the paper,
once a crisis materializes other indicators (such as the distance-to-default or
the bank’s CDS spread) should be preferred from a conceptual perspective.
The CRI could also potentially serve as an input for the computation of risk
weights for regulatory capital requirements. For example, if one (for argu-
ment’s sake) assigns investment grade exposures a risk weight of zero and
subinvestment grade exposures a weight of 100%, the CRI simply gives the
average risk-weight of the banks’credit exposures. The CRI is thus an in-
teresting alternative to the crude risk weights of the standardized approach
of Basel I but also the advanced approach (where banks determine their own
risk-weights) as it does not rely on assessments that are under the discretion
of banks themselves. The CRI may also help bank creditors in gauging the
riskiness of loans, as well as being useful for bank shareholders in assessing
the ability of bank managers to make high quality investments.
The CRI may also help us in the future to better understand the factors
that drive a bank’s credit quality. Previous research, which has mostly fo-
cused on balance sheet data as a measure of credit quality, was constrained
by the absence of comprehensive and independent measures of credit quality.
We believe it may be interesting to use the CRI to study the influence of
factors such as bank strategy (e.g., specialization, growth, relationship ori-
entation), geographical location or corporate governance for credit quality.
The CRI may also be of use for enhancing our understanding of how credit
risk transfer activities at banks (such as securitizations or trading in credit
derivatives) impact credit quality.
Our research also informs the current debate on the effi ciency of financial
markets. While prior to the subprime crisis the consensus probably was that
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markets overall work well in evaluating risks, the crisis has highlighted various
apparent failures in that respect. Since the CRI measures the market’s per-
ception of the proportion of high risk exposures, it allows us to separate this
dimension of potential market failure from the failure to anticipate changes in
default risks overall in the economy. Our empirical results suggests that the
market was well able to spot the composition of risks at banks but failed in
the second dimension, that is, forecasting the deterioration in overall default
rates in the economy during the subprime crisis. These findings add to the
growing perception among academics and policy makers that markets may
work reasonably well in the cross-section but may be more prone to failure
when it comes to the forecasting of future economic conditions (and hence
may fail to avoid the build-up of bubbles).
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2.6 Tables
Table 1: Aggregate CRI
Full Sample 1st subperiod 2nd subperiod 3rd subperiod
∆S&P500(orth) 0.00120*** 0.00138*** 0.00125*** 0.00109***
(7.66e-06) (1.25e-05) (1.40e-05) (1.09e-05)
∆CDS-XO -0.000563*** -0.000896*** -0.000682*** -0.000416***
(9.22e-06) (2.28e-05) (1.68e-05) (1.25e-05)
∆CDS-IG(orth) -0.00305*** -0.00387*** -0.00349*** -0.00281***
(2.88e-05) (0.000151) (5.33e-05) (3.37e-05)
∆1-Month Interest Rate -9.69e-05*** -8.48e-05*** -0.000102*** 0.000296***
(1.00e-05) (1.97e-05) (1.12e-05) (4.69e-05)
∆10-Year Interest Rate 0.000104*** 0.000135*** 0.000161*** 8.73e-05***
(1.43e-05) (2.60e-05) (2.84e-05) (1.90e-05)
∆Inflation -0.000628*** -0.000246*** -0.00135*** -0.000358***
(2.44e-05) (4.99e-05) (6.38e-05) (2.87e-05)
Constant -0.000750*** -0.000537*** -0.00111*** -0.000728***
(6.42e-05) (8.70e-05) (0.000138) (0.000103)
Observations 148653 50513 50177 47963
R2 0.345 0.266 0.355 0.398
CRI 0.1557 0.1879 0.1637 0.1289
95% Confidence Interval 0.1510 0.1603 0.1743 0.2014 0.1562 0.1712 0.1224 0.1354
The dependent variable is the daily change in the individual bank share price (normalized by its mean). The
regression in column (1) is the one of equation (2.9). Columns (2) - (4) report the same regression for each third of
the sample period. Note that the number of observations in the subsamples can differ because only observations are
included where the stock of a bank is actively traded. In addition, failed banks drop from the sample mostly in the
last subsample. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Individual CRIs
Variable Observations Mean Median Min Max St.Dev.
CRI 150 0.1670 0.1537 0.0546 0.4132 0.0561
Table 3: The Relationship between the CRI and
Other Measures of Bank Risk
Coeff. SE
Non-Performing Loans/TL 4.402*** (0.461)
Loan Loss Provisions/TL 9.553*** (0.994)
Loan Loss Allowance/TL 7.698*** (1.036)
Net Charge Offs/TL 11.91*** (1.405)
Tot. Risk Weight. Assets/TA 0.185*** (0.0327)
Loan Growth 0.0561 (0.187)





Real Estate Loans/TL 0.144*** (0.0225)
Dummy Sec. Real Est. Loans -0.00438 (0.0100)
Reported is the coeffi cient of the non-linear Wald test on equation (2.13).
TL= Total Loans; TA= Total Assets; Sec. = Securitization; ***, ** and *
denote a significant relationship between the CRI and the corresponding





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Failure Prediction with Enlarged Sample
Panel A Panel B
Failure in 2 Quarters Failure in 1 Quarter
(1) (2) (1) (2)
CRI 2.118*** 3.002*** 2.182*** 3.010***
(0.634) (1.011) (0.678) (1.126)
Z-score -0.0659 -0.111**
(0.0403) (0.0526)
Constant -2.737*** -2.361*** -2.753*** -2.015***
(0.162) (0.407) (0.171) (0.551)
Observations 1546 1546 1546 1546
pseudo R2 0.0703 0.126 0.0757 0.162
The dependent variable is the bank specific failure indicator for each quarter. All
regressions are based on equation (2.14). Clustered standard errors (at the bank
level) are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively.




































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Rolling and Recursive Window Analysis of the Aggregate CRI
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Figure 2: Scatterplot of Individual CRIs
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2.8 Appendix A: Non-Linear Relationship
between the Value of Loans and the Value
of Bank Equity
The model in Section 2.3 presumes that changes in the value of a bank’s loan
portfolio translate one-to-one into changes in the bank’s equity (in equation
(2.5) we have ∂V (E)
∂V (Loans)
= 1). This may not always be the case. In partic-
ular, the one-to-one relationship will break down if there is an option value
of equity (as predicted by the Merton-model) or due to bailout expectations.
Suppose now instead that we have more generally V (E) = f(V (Loans)),
where f is a continuous and monotonically increasing function but not con-
strained to be linear. The function f may also depend on other bank char-
acteristics, such as its asset risk. Using equation (2.6), we can obtain a
first-order approximation of 4p caused by changes in the value of loans:
4p ≈ f ′(V (Loans))
(
−H 4 CDSH − L4 CDSL
)
= −H · f ′(V (Loans))4 CDSH − L · f ′(V (Loans))4 CDSL.(2.16)
The γ and δ estimated from equation (2.7) will hence be equal to γ = −H ·
f ′(V (Loans)) and δ = −L · f ′(V (Loans)). Thus, if we compute the CRI





−H · f ′(V (Loans))





The reason for this result is as follows. Depending on bank characteristics,
the value of equity may display different sensitivities to the value of the loan
portfolio. Consequently, the sensitivities to changes in the value of high
risk and low risk loans will change as well. However, these sensitivities will
change precisely by the same factor, and since the CRI is a measure of relative
sensitivities, the effect cancels out.
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2.9 Appendix B: Generated Regressors
Since we are using two stages in our analysis (in the first we estimate CRIs
at the bank level, which we later include in the second stage as regressors),
our analysis may suffer from generated regressor problems (see, for example,
Pagan, 1984). While replacing a regressor with its estimate in an OLS re-
gression causes no problems for consistency (Wooldridge, 2002, p.115), it
might do so for inference. This is because the standard errors obtained are
often invalid as they ignore the sampling variation of the estimated regressor.
However, this problem should not apply in our setting since we use different
dimensions in each stage: in the first stage we use the time dimension t (which
ranges from 1 to 1025) to obtain CRI estimates at the bank level, while in the
second stage we use the cross-sectional dimension i (ranging from 1 to 150).
Since our time dimension is large both in an absolute sense and relative to
the cross-sectional dimension (almost seven times larger), asymptotic theory
can be applied here. Based on this theory, the CRIs estimated in the first
step should be asymptotically precise so that we can draw valid statistical
inferences from it when using it in the second stage of our regression.
Chapter 3
Measuring the Tail Risks of
Banks
3.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has demonstrated again that a systemic banking
crisis, a situation in which many banks are in distress at the same time,
can induce large costs for the economy. The task of supervisors and reg-
ulators is to avoid and mitigate, as far as possible, such crises. For this
they need advance information about how banks are exposed to shocks to
the economy. This allows them to identify weak banks and put them under
increased scrutiny but also to monitor general risks in the financial system.
When evaluating the exposure of banks it is also of paramount importance
to distinguish between exposures to normal market shocks, and exposures
to large shocks. For example, a financial institution that follows a tail risk
strategy (such as writing protection in the CDS market) may appear relat-
ively safe in normal periods as it earns steady returns but may actually be
very vulnerable to significant downturns in the economy.
Currently, supervisors and regulators obtain their information to a large
extent from information generated by the bank itself, such as its accounts.
While these sources are a crucial ingredient of the evaluation process they
are not free from drawbacks. For example, most of this information is under
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the discretion of banks and may be used strategically1. Moreover, this data
is typically backward looking and available only at relatively low frequency.
Accounting information also misses important aspects such as informal know-
ledge (e.g., CEO reputation) or information contained in analysts’reports.
In recent years there has been growing interest in using market-based
measures of bank risk. This is on the back of evidence that market signals
contain valuable information about banks’ risks (see Flannery (1998) and
Flannery (2001) for surveys). While some of these measures focus on indi-
vidual bank risk (such as Moody’s KMV), others explicitly take into account
the systemic aspect (e.g., Hartmann et al. (2006), Straetmans et al. (2008),
De Jonghe (2009) and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009)). These methods
have in common that they essentially use information from historical tail
risk events to compute realized tail risk exposures over a certain period.
This paper differs from these approaches in that we develop a forward-
looking measure of bank tail risk. We define a bank’s (systemic) tail risk as
its exposure to a large negative market shock. We measure this exposure by
estimating a bank’s share price sensitivity to changes in far out-of-the-money
put options on the market, correcting for market movements themselves. As
these options only pay out in very adverse scenarios, changes in their prices
reflect changes in the perceived likelihood and severity of market crashes.
Banks that show a high sensitivity to such put options are hence perceived
by the market as being severely affected should such a crash materialize.
As this sensitivity reflects perceived exposures to a hypothetical crash, it is
truly forward-looking in nature. This property is important to the extent that
bank risks change quickly and hence historical tail risk exposures become less
informative. Another advantage of this method is that it does not require the
actual observation of any crashes, as the method relies on changes in their
perceived likelihood.
We use our methodology to estimate tail risk exposures of U.S. bank hold-
ing companies. We find that the estimated exposures are inversely related
1For evidence on such strategic use see, for example, Wall and Koch (2000) and Hasan
and Wall (2004) for the reporting of loan losses and Laeven and Majnoni (2003) for the
provisioning of loan losses. Huizinga and Laeven (2009) also provide evidence that banks
have used accounting discretion to overstate the value of their distressed assets in the
current crisis.
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to their CAPM beta. This seems a very interesting result with potentially
important implications for financial regulation as it suggests that banks that
appear safe in normal periods actually tend to be the banks that are most ex-
posed to crashes. This may be because such banks follow tail risk strategies.
We also compare our measure to a common measure of bank tail risk: the tail
risk beta, which is obtained through quantile regressions. We find that both
measures are fairly uncorrelated and hence provide different information. A
potential explanation for this lies in the backward-looking nature of the tail
risk beta and the fact that its estimation relies on observing (rare) tail risk
events.
We also use our methodology to characterize the main drivers of bank
tail risk. Understanding these drivers is important for regulators as it gives
them information about which activities should be encouraged and which
not. There is so far very little research on this question (a notable excep-
tion is De Jonghe (2009)). Our main findings are that variables which proxy
for traditional banking activities (such as lending) are associated with lower
perceived tail risk. Several non-traditional activities, on the other hand, are
perceived to contribute to tail risk. In particular, we find securities held for-
sale, trading assets and derivatives used for trading purposes are associated
with higher tail risk. These findings are consistent with observed experience
in the current crisis. Interestingly, securitization, asset sales and derivatives
used for hedging are not associated with an increase in tail risk exposure.
This indicates that a transfer of risk itself is not detrimental for tail risk, but
that non-traditional activities that leave risk on the balance sheet are. On
the liability side we find that leverage itself is not related to tail risk but that
large time deposits (which are typically uninsured) are. We also find that
perceived tail risk falls with size, which is indicative of bail-out expectations
due to too-big-to-fail policies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we
briefly review existing measures of tail risk. Section 3.3 develops the method-
ology for measuring tail risk exposure using put option sensitivities. Section
3.4 presents the empirical analysis. Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Existing Tail Risk Measures
The Value-at-Risk (VaR) has for many years been the standard measure used
for risk management. VaR is defined as the worst loss over a given holding
period within a fixed confidence level2. A shortcoming of the VaR is that it
disregards any loss beyond the VaR level. The expected shortfall (ES) is an
alternative risk measure that addresses this issue. The ES is defined as the
expected loss conditional on the losses being beyond the VaR level. Another
frequently used measure is Moody’s KMV. Essentially, Moody’s KMV is a
distance to default measure that is turned into an expected default prob-
ability with the help of a large historical dataset on defaults. The distance
to default is measured as the number of standard deviations by which the
expected asset value exceeds the default point. A firm’s one year expected
default probability is then calculated as the fraction of those firms in previous
years, which had the same distance to default and actually defaulted within
one year.3
While these measures focus on individual bank risk, there has been a
growing interest in recent years in systemic measures of bank risk. One
strand of the literature focuses on tail-betas (e.g., De Jonghe (2009)). This
concept applies extreme value theory to derive predictions about an indi-
vidual bank’s value in the event of a very large (negative) systematic shock.
Loosely speaking, this method uses information from days where stock mar-
ket prices have fallen heavily and considers the covariation with a bank’s
share price on the same day. It thus focuses on realized covariances condi-
tional on large share price drops. A diffi culty encountered when applying
this method is that tail risk observations are rarely observed, and hence a
large number of observations are needed to get accurate estimates (De Jonghe
(2009) suggests at least six years of daily data).
Acharya et al (2008) develop a measure similar to the concept of market
dependence, which is based on expected shortfalls instead of betas. They
2See Standard & Poors (2005) for a brief overview and Jorion (2006) for a more detailed
approach.
3(Subordinated) debt and CDS spreads are an alternative and attractive measure of
a bank’s default risk. A shortcoming of these measures is that these spreads are not
available for many banks (in the case of CDS spreads) and often not very liquid (in the
case of bonds).
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propose measuring the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), which is defined
as the average loss by an institution when the market is in its left tail. Adrian
and Brunnermeier (2009) consider a different aspect of systemic risk. They
estimate the contribution of each institution to the overall system risk. A
bank’s CoVaR is defined as the VaR of the whole financial sector conditional
on the bank being at its own VaR level. The bank’s marginal contribution
to the overall systemic risk is then measured as the difference between the
bank’s CoVaR and the unconditional financial system VaR. An advantage of
the CoVaR is that it is relatively simple to estimate, as it is based on quantile
regressions. In terms of its informational properties it is similar to the tail
risk beta in that it focuses on realized tail risk.
Our measure is most similar to the tail risk betas as we also measure
bank exposures to large market swings. A difference that is important for the
interpretation of the estimates, however, is that while the tail risk beta relates
to large daily market drops, we estimate exposures to a large prolonged
downturn in the market (e.g., several months).
3.3 Measuring Tail Risk Using Put Options
Sensitivities
In this section we present our methodology for measuring banks’ tail risk
exposures. We define the latter to be the bank’s exposure to a general market
crash (that is, a severe downturn in the economy). If the market crashes, a
bank may suffer large, simultaneous losses on its assets, which may push it
close to or into bankruptcy. Crucially, the extent to which it is exposed to
crashes may differ from its normal market sensitivity. Consider two banks,
A and B. Bank A invests mostly in traditional banking assets such as, for
example, loans to businesses and households. Moreover, it invests in assets
that are mainly exposed to normal period risk, such as, for example, junior
tranches of securitization products (which lose value for modest increases in
defaults, but are insensitive to defaults that go beyond the first loss level).
In addition to these assets, bank A insures itself against default by buying
protection on its assets (such as by buying credit default swaps on its loans).
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Bank A’s equity value will thus move more with the market in normal periods
than in times of crisis.
Bank B, by contrast, follows a different business strategy. It does have
traditional assets such as, for example, loans. However, in addition, it also
follows investment strategies that return a small and steady payoff in normal
periods but incur catastrophic losses when the market crashes. Examples for
this would be selling protection in the credit default swap (CDS) market or
buying senior tranches of securitization products, which lose value only when
all other tranches have already incurred a total loss. Thus, even though bank
B’s equity value may behave similarly to bank A’s in normal periods, it tends
to fall relatively more when the market crashes. This scenario is depicted in
Figure 1, where bank A performs better in crash times (market values below
x) than bank B, even though in normal periods equity values are similarly
distributed.
We next describe our method for measuring a bank’s tail risk exposure.
For this suppose that there is a representative firm in the economy (which
we interpret as the market). This firm exists for one period only and its
(stochastic) next period equity value is denoted with x. Similarly, consider
a bank with next period equity value y. We assume for the relationship
between equity values of the bank and the market:
y(x) =
{





if x < x
(3.1)
When x ≥ x, the bank’s equity value is thus identically distributed to that
of a firm with a beta of β. However, for x < x, the bank’s equity value
additionally depends on the relative shortfall of the market to x,x−x
x
(∈ [0, 1]).
For γ > 0 its equity value will be more sensitive to the market, hence the
bank has tail risk over and above the normal period exposure, while for γ < 0
we have the opposite case. Only in the case of γ = 0 does the bank’s tail not
differ from its normal period risk.
Since tail risk realizations (x < x) are rarely observed, our estimation
relies on changes in perceived tail risk, which we will measure through changes
in put options prices. For this consider a put option with strike price x that
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is deep out-of-the-money (x is hence a tail risk realization). We have for the
pay-off from this put
p(x) =
{
0 if x ≥ x
x− x if x < x
(3.2)









Percentage changes in the bank’s equity values (dy(x)
y
) thus relate to percent-
age changes in the market (dx
x
), giving the standard β-effect. Additionally,
they also relate to relative changes in the value of the option, dp
p+x
4, arising
from tail risk exposure.
In our empirical implementation we will identify tail risk sensitivities by
adding a put option (on the market) to a standard market regression and
interpreting the sign of the put option coeffi cient. Tail risk sensitivities will
thus be estimated through changes in put option prices (that is, changes in
expected market crash likelihood and severity).5
3.3.1 A Discussion of the Methodology
We believe that our methodology has several attractive features. First, the
method is forward-looking in nature, that is, it captures expected tail risk
exposure at banks. This contrasts with other popular methods for measuring
tail risk, such as tail risk betas or the CoVAR. These methods essentially
4The correct term here is indeed dpp+x and not, as one might think,
dp
p . The bank-
market relationship consistent with dpp would be y =
xβ
(x−x)γ for x < x as one can easily
verify, which is not a sensible one as for x = x the denominator would then be infinite.
Intuitively, the reason we need to correct for x is that otherwise for a put option with a
low p, small changes in tail risk would translate into large relative put option changes.
5The estimation of γ is akin to estimating the factor-loadings in the asset pricing
literature (see, for instance, Ang et al. (2006) and the references therein). While in the
asset pricing literature the factor loadings are used in a second step to predict returns, we
are interested here in the cross-sectional distribution of the factor-loadings. More precisely,
we propose using the cross-sectional variation to identify banks that are perceived as being
prone to a market crash.
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compute correlations (or covariation) of banks with the market (or other
banks) at days of large share price drops. They thus draw inferences from
historical tail risk distributions and hence measure realized tail risk. The
difference between forward and backward-looking measures is likely to be
limited when banks only undergo small changes in their risks over time, but
is potentially important in a dynamically evolving financial system.
Second, our measure identifies banks’tail risk exposure through changes
in expected market tail risk, as measured by put option prices. This has
the advantage that for our estimation we do not need tail risk events to
actually materialize. Such events, by definition, occur only very infrequently
and hence it is diffi cult to estimate their properties. Existing measures that
rely on the historical distribution of tail risk events reduce this problem by
relying on a large time series and by looking at modest tail risk realizations
that occur more frequently. Our method allows the measurement of exposure
to extreme forms of tail risk (for this one simply includes a very far out-of-
the-money put option) and we can also estimate tail risk exposures using
relatively short horizons.6
Since we measure exposures to market crashes, our measure captures
systemic tail risk exposure. This is desirable since externalities from banking
failures are typically associated with systemic crises, and not isolated bank
failures. It should, however, be kept in mind that a bank that has a low
estimated systematic tail risk may still be individually very risky to the extent
that it pursues activities that are uncorrelated with the market. Finally,
it should be noted that our measure, as other market-based measures, is
net of any bailout expectations. If, for example, markets anticipate that
governments may bail out certain banks, for example because they are too-
big-to-fail, then these banks may have a low perceived tail risk, even if their
underlying activities are relatively risky.
6Another attractive feature of our measure is that it is very easy to compute, as one
simply has to run a market regression amended for a (market) put option.
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3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 Data
We collect daily data on bank share prices and the S&P 500 (our proxy for
the market) for the period October 4th 2005 until September 26th 2008 from
Datastream. Put option data on the S&P 500 (more details will follow below)
for the same period is from IVolatility.7 In addition, various balance sheet
data are collected from the FR Y-9C Consolidated Financial Statements
for Bank Holding Companies (BHCs). We focus on U.S. BHCs which are
classified as commercial banks and for which data is fully available. We
focus on the BHC instead of the commercial bank itself, as typically it is
the BHC that is listed on the stock exchange. Excluded are those banks
whose share price change is zero in more than 10% of the cases in order to
mitigate illiquidity issues. Foreign banks (even when listed in the U.S.) and
pure investment banks are also excluded. The final sample contains 209 Bank
Holding Companies.
An important question is the choice of the option strike price. Ideally we
would choose options such that on each day they represent the same crash
probability. Taking an option with the same strike price each day is hence
not desirable, as market prices change over time and an initially out-of-the-
money option may become an in-the-money option (this is precisely what
would have happened over our sample period). Taking the strike price to be
a (fixed) fraction of the S&P500 is also not a good solution as this ignores
that the likelihood of tail risk realizations is also driven by the volatility. We
hence decided to choose options such that their price does not vary over time,
that is we adjust the option’s strike price each day such that its (previous
day) price stays the same. For this we use an option price of 0.5 (50 cents),
which translates into an implied strike that was on average 33% below the
S&P 500 during our sample period8.
7We also considered using put options on a banking index (the BKX index) instead of
the market. There are two major disadvantages to this. First, the banking sector index
in itself will already reflect tail risk in the financial system, thus the interpretation of
the γ-estimates is not straightforward. Second, put option prices on the index are fairly
illiquid.
8In the more tranquil (low volatility) times of 2006, the average implied strike was still
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In order to compute the option price change for, say day 1, we proceed
as follows. We first identify among all traded options the strike prices that
give day 0 prices closest to 0.5. We then calculate the weight that makes
their average price 0.5. Given this weight, we calculate the weighted average
of their prices at day 1 and calculate from this the change of the price,
dP , from day 0 to day 1. We thus compute price changes of options whose
(hypothetical) strike price varies from day to day.
We initially considered all out-of-the-money puts. A first inspection, how-
ever, revealed that the 100er strikes (i.e. 500, 600, 700 etc.) are much more
liquid than put options with other strike prices. We therefore use only these
puts. For each day an option’s strike price and its price change are then
calculated according to the procedure described above. In order to mitigate
the influence of changes in the remaining time to maturity on our analysis,
we use for this an "on-the-run" series, where each quarter we jump to a more
recently issued option with longer maturity. As a result, the remaining time
to maturity is limited to an interval of between three and six months.
3.4.2 Estimated Tail Risk Exposures
We estimate equation (3.3) for each bank. For this the independent variable is
winsorized at the 2.5% level. Figure 2 shows the tail risk estimates (gammas)
plotted against bank size. It can be seen that there is considerable variation
among the bank’s gammas. There also seems to be a pattern of large banks
having lower tail risk.
An important first question is whether our tail risk measure really adds
anything in terms of informational content to the normal beta. For example,
it may simply be that banks with large tail risk also have large beta. In this
case, estimating the tail risk beta separately is of little value. Figure 3 plots
banks’gammas against betas. The scatter plot shows that this concern is
not justified. In fact, there is a strong negative relationship between beta
and gamma. This suggests that the banks that appear safe if judged by their
beta, are actually the ones that have a high tail risk.
around 28% below the S&P 500 while after June 2007 it was on average around 38% below
the S&P 500.
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What can explain this negative correlation between normal period and tail
risk? One explanation is so-called tail risk strategies, which produce steady
returns in normal periods but actually expose the banks to severe down-
turns. For example, an institution that writes protection in the CDS market
receives in normal periods a steady stream of insurance premia. However, in
a significant recession many exposures will simultaneously default and large
losses may materialize. Many trading strategies, such as the ones exploiting
apparent arbitrage relations, create similar pay-off distributions. Another
explanation for this negative correlation is that highly profitable institutions
that operate in risky environments protect their franchise, for example by
buying protection in the CDS market or by imposing a less fragile capital
structure.
We are also interested in how our measure of tail risk relates to other
measures of tail risk. An easy to implement measure is quantile-betas, which
are obtained by running quantile regressions for an otherwise standard beta
equation (see for example Koenker and Basset (1978) and Koenker and Hal-
lock (2001)). In our context, we are of course interested in the lower quantiles
in such a regression.
Figure 4a shows estimated quantile-betas obtained at the 5th quantile
plotted against our gamma. A negative relationship is detectable, which is
surprising. However, it can be explained by considering Figure 4b, which
plots the quantile-betas against normal betas. We can see that there is a
very strong positive relationship. The likely cause is that the 5th quantile
does not represent suffi ciently extreme risk and hence may not differ that
much from normal period risk. And since we already know that normal
beta and gamma are negatively correlated, this explains the direction of the
relationship in Figure 4a.
We repeat the exercise at the 1st quantile but the results (not reported
here) are similar. Only when we move to the 0.1th quantile (that is lowest
0.1% of the distribution) does the informational content of the quantile-betas
differ from the CAPM betas. Figures 5a and 5b show the results. Figure
5a shows that there is no longer a negative relationship between our gamma
and the quantile beta, and Figure 5b shows that there is also no longer a
relationship with the standard beta.
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Even though a negative correlation between the two tail risk measures is
now absent, it is still surprising that there is no positive relationship between
these measures. They thus seem to pick up different information. One differ-
ence between the methods is obviously that one is backward - and the other
forward-looking. More importantly, however, there is also a conceptual dif-
ference. The quantile regressions capture tail risk as measured by large daily
price changes. In this respect, an institution has a large tail risk beta if it
moves a lot on days where the market drops a lot. This is different from our
gamma, which intends to capture the comovement in case the market crashes
over a period of three to six months (the average maturity of our put op-
tions). Arguably, for financial stability considerations the latter information
is more relevant as large daily market drops (which may occur for example in
a boom) do not necessarily result in stability issues. By contrast, a prolonged
market downturn is likely to cause substantial problems at banks.
This conceptual difference may explain why the correlation among the
measures is low. Consider for example a financial institution that follows a
tail risk strategy by writing protection in the CDS market. This bank will be
vulnerable to a severe downturn in the economy, as discussed earlier, and will
hence have a high estimated gamma. However, the institution will not be
very sensitive to large daily share price fluctuations as long as the downturn
has not set in. Hence, it may have a low quantile-beta.
3.4.3 Determinants of Bank Tail Risk
In this section we are studying whether and how a bank’s business activities
relate to its tail risk. The most obvious way to do this is by regressing (estim-
ated) gammas upon a number of balance sheet variables that represent vari-
ous banking activities. This two step method has two disadvantages. First,
it creates the problem of generated regressors (Pagan, 1984) and second, the
estimation is not effi cient as information from the first step (estimating the
gammas) is not used in the second step.
For these reasons we employ a method which enables us to (effi ciently)
estimate the relationship in one step9. For this we amend equation (3.3) to
9The two-step method, however, yielded very similar results.
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allow a bank’s put option sensitivity to vary with a certain bank activity,
say B. Since this interaction effect could be potentially non-linear in the
activity, we express B relative to its sample mean (B̂ ). In addition, we also
interact the S&P 500 return with the balance sheet variable B to take into
account that general market sensitivities may also differ depending on bank
activities. We obtain the modified equation:
dy(x)
y
= α + (β + θ(B − B̂))dx
x
− (γ + δ(B − B̂)) dp
p+ x
. (3.4)
The coeffi cient δ in this equation gives us the relationship between a
bank’s gamma and activity B (the equivalent of the coeffi cient of a regression
of estimated gammas on B), evaluated at the mean. Since we are interested















where j represents the respective bank activity.
Table 1 presents the balance sheet coeffi cients δ from a set of pooled re-
gressions that are based on equation (3.5). The first column contains the
results from a regression with some basic bank characteristics: size (meas-
ured by the log of total assets), the loan-to-asset ratio and the leverage ratio
(measured by the debt-to-asset ratio). Size is negatively related to tail risk
exposure. This may indicate that markets perceive large banks as being
too-big-to-fail (TBTF). The loan-to-asset ratio is also negatively related to
a bank’s tail risk exposure. This finding is in line with other recent findings:
both De Jonghe (2009) and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2009) find that
traditional banking activities are less risky than non-traditional activities.
The last variable considered is the leverage ratio. Although a higher lever-
age ratio is often associated with more default risk, it does not come out
significant here (we return to this issue later).
Column two focuses on banks’lending activities by including proxies for
loan quality and profitability. Among the loan quality proxies only the loan
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growth variable is significant, indicating a positive relationship with tail risk.
This is consistent with the idea that a bank may only grow faster at the cost
of lowering lending quality, and hence may become more exposed in a down-
turn10. We also find that a higher interest rate on the loans is associated
with less tail risk, which can be explained by the fact that this indicates a
higher profitability of banks, thus exposing it less to a crash in the market.
Additionally, we include the return of assets (ROA) to capture the returns
from other (partly non-traditional) asset activities. We find a positive rela-
tionship with tail risk, which is consistent with other recent findings (e.g.,
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2009))11.
Next, we turn to the influence of other assets. In column three we include
held-to-maturity securities, for-sale securities and trading assets (all scaled
by total assets). Only trading assets turn out significant, and only at the
10% level. At this point, one has to keep in mind that non-traditional activ-
ities are likely to be negatively correlated with traditional activities (banks
may specialize in either), which may create multicollinearity problems and
hence affect the estimates. Therefore, in column four we use the ratio of com-
mercial and industrial loans to total assets (C&I Loans/TA) instead of the
loan-to-asset ratio (the traditional activity) as it is less correlated with the
non-traditional activities. The result is that trading assets and for-sale se-
curities in particular contribute to tail risk. Held-to-maturity securities have
a positive coeffi cient as well, but its magnitude and significance is lower. The
C&I-loans-to-asset ratio is insignificant, similar to the loan-to-asset ratio in
column three.
It has often been argued that non-traditional activities contribute to (tail)
risk exposure. In columns five and six, we will analyze which role financial
innovations play among the non-traditional activities. First, we investigate
securitization and asset sales activities. In addition to the total value of
securitization and asset sales (both scaled by total assets) we also include
10This is in line with other studies, which identify loan growth as a main driver of risk
(see, for example, Foos, Norden and Weber (2010)).
11Note that the interest income from loans is a part of the ROA so that potential
multicollinearity issues could affect the results. However, tests in which we split the ROA
into returns from loans and returns from remaining assets revealed that this is not a
problem in our case.
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the internal and external credit exposure arising from these activities. The
internal credit exposure arises from a bank’s own securitization or asset sale
activities via recourse and other credit enhancing agreements between the
bank and its special purpose vehicle (SPV). An external credit exposure can
arise if a bank provides any kind of credit enhancements to other banks’
securitization structures.
Column five shows that only the external credit exposure variable is sig-
nificant and positive. This is in line with our prior findings as external credit
exposure is new credit exposure taken on in addition to existing exposure.
Moreover, such exposure (for example, from credit enhancements) only ma-
terializes under relatively adverse scenarios, and hence should be related to
tail risk. The insignificance of a bank’s own securitization and asset sale
activities may indicate that opposing forces are at work. On the one hand,
securitization and asset sales are, by themselves, of course a mean of off-
loading risk to other market participants, making a bank less risky. In par-
ticular, if the bank keeps the equity tranche but sells senior tranches it sheds
tail risk relative to normal period risk. On the other hand, recent experience
has shown that these activities induced banks to take on more risk.12 In ad-
dition, although the credit exposure seemingly disappeared from the balance
sheet to the SPV (which is legally independent), the market might expect
that this separation would not survive when the SPV encounters large losses.
A bank might be forced to buy back the assets from the SPV to protect its
reputation and customer base (as happened in the case of Bear Stearns).
Therefore, the credit exposure (which is mostly tail risk exposure) may not
be effectively removed through securitization.
Column six focuses on banks’derivatives activities. Based on the avail-
able data, we can make the distinction between derivatives that are held
for trading purposes and derivatives that are held for other purposes (most
likely hedging). A priori one would expect that the latter would reduce tail
risk. The effect for derivatives trading a priori is less clear cut. Resulting
counterparty risk (which tends to materialize in tail risk scenarios) may, for
example, create an increase in tail risk exposure. The results in column six
12For example, Franke and Krahnen (2007) and Nijskens and Wagner (2008) find that
securitization increases a bank’s beta.
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show that derivatives held for trading contribute to tail risk, while the other
derivatives do not seem to affect it. The latter is somewhat surprising but
may be explained by the fact that only some of these derivatives are used for
hedging and that they create counterparty risk as well.
The last column takes a closer look at the importance of capital structure
for tail risk. In column one we found that the leverage ratio does not contrib-
ute to tail risk exposure. We now include information on the share of deposits
and the composition of deposits. In the last column of Table 1, in addition
to the variables from column one, we consider the deposit-to-liabilities ratio
and the ratio of time deposits above $100,000 to domestic13 deposits. Time
deposits above $100,000 are typically not insured, which makes them similar
to wholesale funding, as both funding sources might be prone to runs. The
results in column seven show that the leverage ratio is again not significant.
Insignificance also obtains for the deposit-to-liabilities ratio. However, the
time deposits above $100,000 do contribute positively and significantly to tail
risk. Since these deposits are subject to withdrawal risks similar to wholesale
funding, this result is consistent with Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2009)
who find that wholesale funding increases bank risk14.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we propose a forward-looking method to measure (systemic)
tail risk exposures at banks. Tail risk is defined as a bank’s exposure to
a large negative market shock and it is measured by estimating a bank’s
share price sensitivity to changes in far out-of-the-money put options on the
market, correcting for market movements themselves. Because far out-of-the-
money put options on the market only pay out if the market crashes, changes
in their prices reflect changes in the perceived likelihood and severity of a
crash. The estimated sensitivities, in turn, represent the market’s perception
of exposures to a hypothetical crash, making them a truly forward-looking
13The FR Y-9C reports do not contain information on deposits in foreign subsidiaries,
hence we scale by domestic deposits.
14Note that Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga do not distinguish between normal times risk
and tail risk but focus instead on the Z-score.
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measure. Another attractive feature of this measure is that it does not require
the actual observation of tail risk events since it identifies banks’ tail risk
exposure through changes in expected market tail risk. Our measure is also
relatively easy to estimate as it basically comes from an amended market
regression.
The application to U.S. bank holding companies yields several interesting
facts about their tail risk exposures. For example, tail risk seems to be
negatively correlated with the CAPM share price beta. This suggests that
banks which appear safer in normal periods are actually more crisis prone.
We also find that the impact of non-traditional activities on tail risk depends
on whether they leave assets on the balance sheets or not. In the former
case they increase tail risk, while in the latter they do not. Our results also
suggest that leverage itself does not increase tail risk, but will do so if it
comes through uninsured deposits.
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3.6 Tables
Table 1: Relationship between Gamma and Bank Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(TA) -2.722*** -2.934*** -2.681*** -2.708*** -2.530*** -3.237*** -2.571***
(0.371) (0.384) (0.541) (0.492) (0.415) (0.476) (0.427)
Debt/TA 0.727 36.53 -21.45 -19.68 2.117 -6.373 -3.771
(29.25) (30.54) (33.01) (30.79) (30.08) (29.85) (29.97)
Loans/TA -23.12*** -12.46*** 2.485 -23.02*** -21.28*** -23.16***
(4.433) (4.128) (18.17) (4.440) (4.637) (4.785)
Non-Performing Loans/TL -106.3
(75.26)








Held-to-Maturity Securities/TA 25.62 23.33*
(23.37) (13.38)
For-Sale Securities/TA 31.25 28.64***
(21.01) (6.360)








Int. Credit Exp. Sec.& Sales 0.953
(1.486)
Ext. Credit Exp. Sec.& Sales 147.4**
(64.64)
Derivatives held for trading/TA 0.361***
(0.108)
Derivatives not for trading/TA 3.092
(3.605)




Observations 154242 154242 154242 154242 154242 154242 154242
R2 0.230 0.239 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.230
This table reports the coeffi cients of the interaction terms between the adjusted put option and the respective balance sheet variables. It
represents the effect of the respective balance sheet item on a bank’s tail risk exposure where a positive value implies a larger exposure
to tail risk. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and significance is denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.7 Figures
Figure 1: Relationship between Bank and Market Values
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Figure 4b: Beta vs. Quantile-Beta (5% Quantile)
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Chapter 4
Bank Aggressiveness in the
Syndicated Loan Market
4.1 Introduction
In perfectly competitive loan markets without any frictions loan spreads
should represent the borrower’s underlying risks and thus be mainly determ-
ined by borrower and loan characteristics. In reality, however, credit markets
exhibit various deviations from such an outcome. Depending on the severity
of these frictions loan spreads can exhibit larger or smaller deviations from
this effi cient pricing rule that is based on the borrower and loan characterist-
ics. The most important frictions include asymmetric information, imperfect
competition, and legal constraints. As a result of these frictions banks screen
and monitor borrowers and may gain bargaining or market power vis-à-vis
borrowers. In short, bank supply conditions and bargaining considerations
matter.
This paper studies the part of the loan pricing that is not related to bor-
rower and loan characteristics. I regress the loan spread of a syndicated loan
on borrower and loan characteristics. The residual of this pricing regression
is averaged over all borrowers at the bank level and is called pricing aggress-
iveness. It represents the part of the loan spread that cannot be explained
by borrower or loan characteristics but instead by a bank’s characteristics1.
1In principle it is possible that unobserved borrower characteristics may also play a
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Factors that influence these characteristics include, for example, bank credit
supply conditions, the general bank strategy, and its risk appetite. This im-
plies that aggressiveness may differ from a bank’s riskiness, which is often
used as a key variable in the regulatory and supervisory process. A bank
with a growing risk appetite, for instance, may decide to focus lending more
on riskier borrowers. Aggressiveness, on the other hand, may change even
when the risk characteristics of the loan portfolio remain the same. It thus
represents a different dimension of bank behavior2. Given that changes in
aggressiveness may have implications for the soundness of a bank, a proper
understanding of banks’aggressiveness should be in the interest of super-
visors and regulators.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper that attempts to investigate the
aggressiveness of banks via the pricing channel. The existing literature often
focuses on loan growth or covenants in loans to proxy for aggressive or risky
bank behavior (see, for example, Mason et al. (2009) and Foos, Norden and
Weber (2010)). The advantage of the pricing approach is that changes in a
bank’s loan policy can be detected more timely and at a more detailed level
compared to the balance sheet information. This may give supervisors and
regulators early indications of changes in bank behavior well before these
changes can be detected in the balance sheet. These early indications may
be particularly valuable in times of crisis since balance sheet information
has been shown to be less reliable especially in those times as, for example,
Huizinga and Laeven (2009) have shown.
The proposed aggressiveness measure is studied in the context of the
global syndicated loan market. Using data from the Reuters LPC Deals-
can database, I obtain detailed information on 40203 syndicated loans from
around the world for the years 1987 to 2009. I focus on the top 100 lead ar-
role. For example, for all given observable characteristics a borrower may be more or less
risky. In this paper it is less of a concern since I aggregate the estimated residuals at the
bank level so that idiosyncratic unobservable risks should cancel out.
2I prefer the term aggressiveness over the term discretion since it already gives the
reader an idea of the direction of discretion. A very aggressive bank uses its discretion to
underprice a loan for the given borrower and loan characteristics while a bank with very
little aggressivenss uses the discretion to overcharge a borrower for the given borrower and
loan characteristics. In both cases discretion is involved but only the term aggressiveness
clearly shows which type of discretion a bank is exhibiting.
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rangers, defined as the banks with the 100 largest number of deals arranged
during the sample period. I estimate the aggressiveness measure and examine
it across various dimensions.
I find that the average aggressiveness varies considerably among the
banks. Even among selected top 10 lead arrangers a difference of 50 basis
points can be observed for most years of the sample. Similarly, the difference
between the ten most and ten least aggressive lead arrangers is at least 150
basis points throughout the sample. However, the aggressiveness differences
are larger in the first part of the sample. They tend to converge somewhat
around the year 1999 before they widen slightly in the following years and
increase substantially in the last years of the sample. A similar observation
can be made for the full sample including all top 100 lead arrangers. This
time series variation does not seem to be related to business cycle move-
ments, as measured by U.S. GDP growth. They only seem to influence the
aggressiveness in the last years of the sample where the financial crisis hit
the global economy. Instead, other factors such as, for instance, idiosyncratic
pricing seem to be related to aggressiveness.
Overall, the analysis of the top 10 lead arrangers, all lead arrangers, and
the most and least aggressive lead arrangers presents one consistent picture.
Throughout the sample there is considerable variation of aggressiveness over
time and among banks. Especially the variation among banks suggest that
seemly identical borrowers can face different loan spreads depending on the
aggressiveness of the bank. These differences can be as large as 50 basis
points even among the top 10 lead arrangers. This implies a certain degree of
ineffi ciency as identical borrowers should face identical loan spreads. Instead
the results suggest that borrowers can pay too much or too little for their
loans, which may result in an ineffi cient allocation of capital at the aggregate
level and thus lower economic growth.
The differences in aggressiveness among banks warrant a closer look into
bank-specific factors that may help to explain these differences. In order
to understand how bank-specific factors may influence a bank’s aggressive-
ness, I obtain bank-specific balance sheet information from the Bankscope
database and regress the average yearly aggressiveness per bank upon lagged
yearly bank characteristics. I find that loan loss provisions are significantly
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related to aggressiveness, both alone and in combination with loan loss re-
serves or nonperforming loans. Higher provisions the year before suggest a
less aggressive behavior in the current year. This result suggests that when
problems in the loan book arise, banks do not just reduce quantity but also
adjust the pricing. In addition, I find that an increase in bank size is re-
lated with lower aggressiveness while banks with a high leverage ratio seem
to price more aggressively. The latter result is likely due to a high overall
risk appetite. Loan levels and loan growth, on the other hand, do not seem
to influence the aggressiveness. Similarly, the liabilities structure does not
seem to influence a bank’s aggressiveness either.
The last question that I address is the question whether the aggressiveness
can indicate future changes in a bank’s condition. This application may be of
particular value in, for example, supervisory and regulatory processes as they
often rely on bank-specific balance sheet information, which are typically
reported with a lag. I find that less pricing aggressiveness is related to
increasing return on assets in the short run (one year) and lower loan loss
reserves and a higher Tier one capital ratio over the short and medium term
(one to three years). Taken together, these findings may be of interest for a
supervisor or regulator as they suggest that a bank’s aggressiveness can be
used as an leading indicator for coming changes in a bank’s balance sheet
items and thus provide more timely updates about the condition of a bank.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the process of loan
syndication and Section 3 reviews the literature. Section 4 explains how the
pricing aggressiveness is measured, including a brief discussion of its major
properties. The data and the empirical results are presented in Section 5 and
6, respectively. Section 7 concludes.
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4.2 Syndicated Loans
In a syndicated loan, a collection of banks forms a bank syndicate in order
to jointly make a loan to a borrower3. That loan can be made in one whole
sum or split up into several tranches (also called facilities) with varying sizes
spreads, maturities and other characteristics The banks in the syndicate can
be divided into two groups, namely lead arrangers and participant banks.
The lead arrangers can be seen as the senior members of the syndicate as they
establish and maintain a relationship with the borrower. This implies that
they directly negotiate with the borrowing firm but are also responsible for
the information collection and distribution among the syndicate. In addition,
they are expected to hold a larger portion of the loan than other participating
banks. Once the loan is made they are also responsible for the monitoring
and administration of the loan. Note, that depending on the preferences of
the borrower, there can be one or several lead arrangers in the syndicate. In
the latter case, the responsibilities among the lead arrangers may also differ,
as Sufi (2007) and François and Missonier-Piera (2007) note.
Despite these responsibilities lead arrangers may have good reasons to
act as a lead arranger. First, it enables a bank to cultivate the relationship
with the borrower while diversifying its loan exposure and income. This can
be achieved because the lead arranger is able to meet the borrower’s demand
for a loan without risking excessive single-name exposures, which ensures
that regulatory limits on risk concentration are adhered to. The income
is diversified because the lead arranger not only earns the spread on the
loan but also some fees for arranging and administering the loan. Moreover,
being selected as a lead arranger is seen as good advertisement since it is
a prestigious position and banks are keen on publishing this information
through the league tables, as Ivashina (2009) notes.
Participant banks form the junior group of the syndicate. The size and
composition of the group typically depends on the size, complexity and pri-
cing of the loan. In addition, it may be restricted by the willingness of
the borrower to increase the range of its banking relationships as Gadanecz
3The information in this section is based on Gadanecz (2004) and Sufi (2007). For
more information on syndicated loans, see also Esty (2001).
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(2004) notes. The junior members are typically not involved in the loan ne-
gotiations nor do they receive any fees. Instead they are approached by the
lead arrangers and simply asked whether they want to join at the negotiated
conditions, that is to provide the required capital and receive the margin that
the lead arranger negotiated with the borrower. Nevertheless, these banks
may have several reasons for participating in the syndicate. It may be out of
necessity if the banks simply lacks the origination capability in certain types
of transactions, geographical areas or industrial sectors. However, according
to Gadanecz (2004) it may also be a deliberate choice if the bank wants to
cut down on origination costs. In addition, participating banks may also
hope for additional business in the future, such as treasury management,
corporate finance or advisory work4.
According to Sufi (2007) the process of a loan syndication works as fol-
lows. The borrowing firm and the lead arrangers negotiate a preliminary loan
agreement (“mandate”), which specifies the loan amount, a range for the in-
terest rate, covenants, fees, and collateral. After signing this agreement, the
lead arrangers approach potential participant lenders for the funding of the
loan and provide them with an information memorandum, which contains
detailed and confidential information about the borrowing firm. After all
participants agreed to fund part of the loan, the loan agreement is signed by
all parties. Except for the share of the loan the contract terms are typically
identical for all syndicate members, which implies that only one contract ex-
ists. Each member is responsible for providing her share of the loan. The lead
arranger, in turn, also has monitor the firm, govern the terms of the loan,
administer the drawdown of funds, calculate interest payments, and enforce
financial covenants because she is typically also chosen to be the "agent"
bank. For arranging and managing the syndicated loan the lead arranger
receives various fees, which is paid by the borrowing firm. In addition, the
borrowing firm also has to pay fees to the banks for providing the capital
(both in drawn and undrawn states)5. The so-called "All-in spread drawn"
is often reported as a measure of the annual borrowing costs for the borrower.
4Gadanecz (2004) quotes Allen (1990) as the source but I was not able to confirm this
directly as I could not find Allen (1990) on the internet.
5For a more detailed discussion of the fees, see Gadanecz (2004).
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It is expressed in basis points paid over LIBOR and includes various fees and
the arranged spread. According to Ivashina (2009), it is defined by DealScan
as the total annual cost paid over LIBOR for each dollar used under the loan
commitment.
4.3 Literature
The theoretical literature on the motives for financial institutions to form
a syndicate typically focuses on securities syndicates in general rather the
loan syndicates in particular. A non-exhaustive list of motives includes risk
diversification and risk sharing (Wilson (1968), Mandelker and Raviv (1977),
and Chowdhry and Nanda (1996)), the exchange of information, experience,
and expertise (Millon and Thakor (1985), Sah and Stiglitz (1986), Tykvová
(2007), and Biais and Perotti (2008)), solving moral hazard in team prob-
lems (Pichler andWilhelm (2001, and Bubna (2002)), preventing competition
(Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007)), deterrence of theft of idea (Bachman
and Schindele (2006)), and inducing information revelation of the syndicate
members (Cestone et al. (2007)).
On the empirical side, various strands of the loan syndication literature
have been explored. Among the motives for loan syndication, diversification
and capital regulations seems to be the main reasons (Simons (1993) and
Dennis and Mullineaux (2000)). When investigating what types of loans are
more likely to be syndicated, Simons (1993) uses ex post examiner ratings as
a proxy for quality and finds that lead arrangers syndicate a larger portion
of quality loans. Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) find that lead arrangers are
more likely to syndicate loans when the lead arranger has a good reputation,
when the borrowing firm is public and thus more information about the firm
is available, and when the loan’s maturity increases.
The pricing strand of the empirical side is explored a bit more in detail.
Examples include Angbazo et al. (1998), Thomas and Wang (2004), Harjoto
et al. (2006), and Ivashina (2009)6. The analysis Angbazo et al. (1998) ex-
amines the determinants of the credit spreads on highly leveraged transaction
6Note that in this section I only present the main findings of the pricing papers. More
detailed information about the specific variables can be found in section 4.4.
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(HLT) loans. In addition, it analyzes how well the HLT loan market and the
competing corporate bond market are integrated. Their findings suggest that
the pricing in the HLT loan and corporate bond markets diverge. Moreover,
they find that several borrower quality characteristics to be important de-
terminants of HLT loan spreads. These will be explained in section 4.4 more
in detail. Similarly, Thomas and Wang (2004) examine the integration of
syndicated loan and junk bond markets and find that market integration has
dramatically increased since traded HLT syndicated loans were available as
an alternative to other high-yield bonds. Harjoto et al. (2006) compare the
syndicated loan pricing of investment and commercial banks. They find that
investment banks seem to charge less for credit risk on the margin but that
this difference is much weaker once borrower specific information is included.
Ivashina (2009) addresses the question how large the impact of asymmetric
information between the lead arranger and members of the syndicate on the
loan spread is. In theory there are two opposing forces. On the one hand,
syndicate members require a premium for the informational advantage that
the lead arranger has. Alternatively, they ask him to retain a larger share
of the loan. The lead arranger, on the other hand, demands a diversification
premium if he has to hold a relatively large share. Faced with this problem
of endogeneity of the spread and the lead’s share Ivashina (2009) is able to
identify the asymmetric information effect using the idiosyncratic credit risk
of the lead bank’s loan portfolio as an instrument.
Apart from the pure pricing issues, other deal characteristics have also
been explored. Covenants are more likely to be used when the borrowing
firm is small, has high growth opportunities, or is highly leveraged (Bradley
and Roberts (2004)) while restrictions on loan sales are more likely to be
imposed when the borrowing firm is small (Pyles and Mullineax (2008)).
One of the larger strands of the literature investigates the structure of
the syndicate. Melnik and Plaut (1996) investigate underwriting syndicates
in the Eurocredit market. Their evidence suggests that lead managers are
primarily recruited for risk bearing and sharing purposes. Regular managers,
on the other hand, seem to be primarily recruited to expand the distribution
of the loan. Song’s (2004) findings suggest that members of the syndic-
ate as well as the borrower benefit when underwriters with complementary
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abilities form a syndicate. François and Missonier-Piera (2007) find that
lead arrangers share administrative tasks with so called co-agents when the
loan size is small and its maturity is short. However, once the informational
asymmetry between the lead arranger and other syndicate members becomes
larger, co-agents also act as delegated monitors. This is because they gain
insight through the administrative tasks and are thus better able to monitor
the lead arranger. In addition, Sufi (2007) finds that lead arrangers chose
participants that are more likely to “know”the firm when there is limited in-
formation about a borrower. Cai et al. (2010) investigate how the similarity
of banks in terms of lending expertise affect the organizational structure of a
syndicate. The authors measure the similarity by a set of Euclidean distances
between two lenders across various dimensions and find that lead arrangers
prefer banks with a small distance, hence a similar lending expertise. These
close competitors obtain more senior roles and hold larger loan shares. The
authors suggest that this is done to delegate some monitoring responsibilities
and thus lower the overall loan syndication costs.
Information asymmetries within the syndicate also play a major role in
shaping the structure of the syndicate. When the lead arranger has better
or private information about a borrower, other syndicate members may, in
theory, require him to hold a larger portion of the loan in order to keep up his
incentives to properly screen and monitor the loan. Various papers confirm
this theoretical reasoning. Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) proxy the quality
of the information about the borrower with credit ratings and stock exchange
listings and find evidence that better quality enables lead arrangers to keep
a smaller share of the loan. With similar proxies, Lee and Mullineaux (2004)
find that syndicates are more concentrated when the information about a
borrowing firm is scarce and when the borrower’s credit risk is larger. Jones,
Lang, and Nigro (2005) proxy information asymmetry with dummies for the
availability of a CUSIP number, the existence of a branch in the state of the
borrower’s headquarter, and the borrower being active in the service sector.
All proxies suggest that greater information asymmetry is associated with a
larger loan share. In addition, the authors find that the retained loan share
is larger if the lead arrangers are less capital-constrained, their loan port-
folio has a lower concentration of lower quality loans, and the maturity is
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longer since longer maturities are typically granted to better quality borrow-
ers. Sufi (2007) uses proxies similar to Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) and
Lee and Mullineaux (2004) and concludes that higher degrees of information
asymmetries force lead arrangers to retain a larger share of a loan and thus
form more concentrated syndicates.
There exist, however, also mitigating factors that partly offset the effects
of the information asymmetries. The reputation of the lead arranger seems to
be a prominent one. Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) measure reputation with
the lead arranger’s credit rating and the volume of repeat business between
the lead arranger and a syndicate member and find that a lead arranger’s
reputation can mitigate the effects of asymmetric information. Similarly, Sufi
(2007) takes the lead arranger’s last year market share (based on amounts)
as a proxy for reputation and also finds that reputation can reduce, but not
eliminate, problems of information asymmetry. He also suggests that bor-
rower reputation, measured by the repeated access to the syndicated loan
market, can have a similar effect. Lastly, De Haas and van Horen (2010)
investigate how macroeconomic factors influence the syndicate structure. In
particular, they investigate how the recent financial crisis affected the screen-
ing and monitoring efforts and thus the syndicate structure. Their evidence
suggests that during the crisis syndicates became significantly more concen-
trated, which, according to the authors, points to an increased focus on
screening and monitoring. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010a), on the other
hand, investigate how the recent financial crisis affected the supply of syn-
dicated loans. They find that especially those banks had to cut lending that
did not have easy access to deposit financing and those that co-signed credit
lines with Lehman Brothers and were thus forced to provide more liquidity.
Legal and financial systems can also influence the syndicate structure.
Esty and Megginson (2003) take the La Porta et al. (1998) creditor rights
index to investigate if creditor protection and the enforcement of laws have
an impact on syndicate structure. They find that in order to facilitate monit-
oring and low cost contracting, smaller and more concentrated syndicates are
formed whenever strong creditor rights and reliable legal enforcement exist.
However, in the absence of strong creditor rights and reliable legal enforce-
ment, lenders prefer to form larger and more diffuse syndicates in order to
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discourage strategic default. Similarly, Esty (2004) examines under which
circumstances foreign banks are more willing to provide funds. His evidence
suggests that this is more likely in countries with a better legal enforcement
and better creditor rights, and in countries with less developed financial sys-
tems and lower shares of government ownership of banking assets. Qian and
Strahan (2007) also follow La Porta et al. (1998) and they, too, find that
increased participation by foreign banks is more likely with a strong protec-
tion of creditor rights. Moreover, they find that the latter is also associated
with greater concentration of loan ownership and longer maturities.
Another strand of the literature uses event study methodologies to ex-
amine the announcement effects of syndicated loans. Megginson, Poulsen,
and Sinkey (1995) examine the overall announcement effect of syndicated
loans on the stock return of the participating banks. Compared to sovereign
loans, corporate loans in the 1980’s are associated with significant abnormal
positive returns. Among the corporate loans alone, loans with a takeover fin-
ancing purpose result in significant positive returns. The authors interpret
this as banks being able to earn larger returns if the borrower is in urgent
need of large amounts of capital to finance takeovers. Preece and Mullineaux
(1996), on the other hand, focus on the effect on the borrower’s stock return
by investigating whether the size of a lending syndicate has an effect on the
borrower’s stock return. Their analysis is based upon the hypothesis that
larger syndicates make negotiations about loan restructuring more diffi cult
due to potential hold-up problems. Hence, larger syndicates should result in
lower returns if contractual flexibility is a source of value to borrowers. The
evidence supports their hypothesis since the relationship between abnormal
returns and syndicate size is negative.
In addition to investigating deal characteristics at the time of the syn-
dication the default performance of syndicated loans can also be examined.
Altman and Suggitt (2000), for example, find almost no difference in the
cumulative default rates of syndicated loans and comparably rated corporate
bonds when focusing on the four and five year maturity horizon. Syndicated
loan default rates, however, seem to be higher in the first two years after
issuance. As noted above, Cai et al. (2010) examine the similarity in lending
expertise among syndicate members and their effect on various outcomes.
84 CHAPTER 4. BANK AGGRESSIVENESS
With respect to borrower default performance, they find that borrowers are
actually somewhat more likely to default if syndicate members have a similar
lending expertise.
Finally, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010b) examine whether syndicated
loans also have an effect on macroeconomic variables. More precisely, they
investigate whether loan syndication can amplify credit cycles. The hypo-
thesis crucially depends on whether in a recession the lead arrangers have to
retain a larger or smaller share of the loans. Should banks be forced to retain
larger shares of the loans on their books capital constrained banks might be
less willing to participate in further syndications, which might amplify credit
cycles and vice versa. Their evidence suggests that the lead arranger’s share
increases during recessions, which has the potential to amplify credit cycles.
4.4 Measuring Aggressiveness in the
Syndicated Loan Market
In a first-best world without any market frictions loan spreads should be
fully determined by observable information. In reality, however, credit mar-
kets, like many other markets, exhibit various deviations from the first-best
outcome. The most important examples include asymmetric information,
legal constraints, and imperfect competition. Depending on the severity of
these frictions loan spreads can exhibit larger or smaller deviations from the
first-best pricing rule. This dispersion may be explained by screening and
monitoring efforts of banks, but also market power of banks or bargaining
power of banks and borrowers. Especially the latter two imply that banks
have some room for maneuver and are thus able to actively chose the loan
spread for given observable borrower and loan characteristics. This willing-
ness to make a loan is exactly what I am after. Correcting for borrower, loan
and loan market characteristics, loan spreads still differ due to a varying
bank willingness to make a certain loan.
I call this aggressiveness for the following reasons. First, imagine that a
loan exhibits a spread much larger than its observable characteristics would
justify. In this case I would speak of a low willingness to make that loan
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since the bank asked for a high spread. However, this case could be confused
with a large reluctance to make that loan so that one might ask why the
bank made the loan in the first place. To avoid this confusion I prefer to
speak of pricing aggressiveness or simply aggressiveness. Second, willingness
to make a loan might be confused with risk appetite. One could argue that
whenever a bank has a larger risk appetite it also more willing to make a
loan. However, my measure of aggressiveness differs from risk appetite as I
will discuss more in detail in section 4.4.1.
The general approach to measure aggressiveness is as follows. First I
regress the all-in spread of a syndicated loan on borrower, loan and loan
market characteristics. This is done to control for all potential borrower in-
fluences like, for example, its risk characteristics, a proxy for the information
asymmetry between borrower and lender, and the bargaining power of the
borrower. Similarly, I want to control for all loan characteristics and the lead
arranger’s position in the loan market. The latter is done to rule out that
aggressiveness depends on the market position of the lead arranger because
in that case I would probably find that banks with a larger market share are
automatically less aggressive.
The resulting residual of that regression is the part that cannot be ex-
plained by those observable characteristics. This is what I define as a bank’s
aggressiveness, as it represents the part that depends on a bank’s willingness
to make that particular loan, given the existing risk characteristics.
More precisely, the all-in spread of a syndicated loan i is regressed upon
available borrower characteristics W , loan characteristics X and lead ar-
ranger characteristics Z, as shown in equation (4.1):
allinspreadi = α + βWi + γXi + δZi + εi (4.1)
Next, the residual εi is taken as the lead arranger’s aggressiveness in the
syndicated loan i7. In case the syndicated loan contains several tranches, the
analysis is done at the tranche level rather than the deal level, as the tranches
7Note, that in the following analysis the residual is not analyzed at the individual
loan level but is averaged across various dimensions, such as, for example, the bank-year
level. Estimating the residual at the individual loan level still has the advantage that the
dispersion can be analyzed, too.
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are likely to have different spreads, amounts and maturities. However, in
cases of several tranches, I cannot use all tranches of the deal and thus focus
on the largest tranche of each deal. The reason is that I cannot treat each
tranche as an independent observation as I discuss more in detail in the data
section.
Note, that syndicate characteristics like, for instance, the number of lead
arrangers and their share of the loan (among each other and compared to
the participants), are not included as explanatory variables. This is because
the spreads of a syndicated loan and the syndicate characteristics are de-
termined simultaneously, as Sufi (2007) and Ivashina (2009) discuss more in
detail. To prevent the resulting issues of endogeneity, I decided to leave these
characteristics out.
The borrower characteristics W include the following variables. Sales,
measured as the natural logarithm of the company sales, is a proxy for in-
formation asymmetry. According to Harjoto et al. (2006), a larger company
with higher sales is associated with lower information asymmetries so that
the expected coeffi cient should be negative. Based on the same reasoning, the
coeffi cient for Ticker, a dummy equal to one if the borrowing company has
a ticker symbol, should be negative, too. Another set of borrower character-
istics are Credit Ratings (see, for instance, Ivashina (2009) and Sufi (2007)).
They represent a set of dummies (one for each Standard & Poor’s senior debt
rating) with BBB being the omitted category. In general it is expected that
spreads increase with a deteriorating credit rating. In addition, I employ the
dummy Not Rated, which is equal to one if a borrower is not rated and the
dummy CP Rating, which is equal to one if the borrower has a commercial
paper rating. The expected coeffi cient of the former dummy is positive as it
is a proxy for larger information asymmetries while the expected coeffi cient
of the latter is negative since a commercial paper rating is an additional
signal that reduces the informational asymmetry. Previous Relationship is
a dummy that is equal to one if over last 3 years the same lead arranger
arranged a loan for same borrower (Ivasina (2009)) while Borrower Reputa-
tion represents the number of syndicated loans that the borrower obtained
before (Sufi(2007)). The expected signs of both dummies should be negative
since in both cases the borrower is better known to the market and the lead
4.4. MEASURING AGGRESSIVENESS 87
arranger. The last two sets of borrower characteristics include industry and
country dummies. The industry dummies are at the two digit SIC level with
no information about the SIC code being the omitted category. The USA
forms the omitted category of the country dummies.
Among the loan characteristics X, Secured represents a dummy equal to
one if the loan is secured. In theory, the sign of its coeffi cient is ambiguous,
because on the one hand pledging collateral makes the loan safer but on
the other hand banks will require collateral for borrowers with higher risk.
Harjoto et al.(2006), however, expect a positive sign as they note that prior
studies, such as Angbazo et al. (1998), mostly find higher spreads for secured
commercial loans. This is because lenders often require collateral on high-risk
loans but the pledged collateral cannot fully offset the initially higher spread.
A similar theoretical reasoning applies to the dummies Financial Covenants
and Performance Pricing, which are equal to one if the loan contract includes
financial covenants and performance pricing, respectively. Ivashina (2009)
notes that both measures itself help to reduce moral hazard issues resulting
from asymmetric information, making the loan less risky. However, it is
likely that both measures are only taken when the borrower is very opaque
and risky. Consequently, the expected coeffi cients are ambiguous. The last
two proxies for informational asymmetry are the natural logarithm of the
tranche amount, Amount, and the Number of Facilities (see, for instance,
Ivashina (2009)). The expected sign of both is ambiguous. On the one hand,
a larger amount or a larger number of facilities makes the overall deal bigger
and that is typically associated with larger, less opaque borrowers. On the
other hand, it typically raises the amount each lead arranger has to keep,
which increases its risk concentration and in turn raises the spread.
In order to control for the maturity of a loan I follow Harjoto et al.(2006)
by using three dummies. Short Maturity is a dummy equal to one if the
loan is a revolver and has a maturity of less than 365 days. According to
the authors, its coeffi cient should be negative because these loans should be
cheaper as they do not require any regulatory capital. Intermed Maturity
is equal to one if the maturity of the loan ranges from two to five years
and Long Maturity is equal to one if the maturity exceeds 5 years. The
expected coeffi cients of the latter two dummies are ambiguous as Harjoto et
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al.(2006) point out. They present various papers with mixed evidence on the
relationship between spreads and maturity.
Other loan characteristics that need to be controlled for include a term
loan indicator and the purpose of the loan, as, for example, Angbazo et al.
(1998) point out. They find that, ceteris paribus, term loans have higher
spreads than revolvers and that the spread can differ depending on the pur-
pose of the loan. Therefore, I include the dummy Term, which is equal to
one if the deal contains a term loan, and, following Sufi (2007), 4 Loan Pur-
pose dummies for general corporate purposes,debt repayment, acquisitions,
and backup lines, respectively. All other purposes form the omitted category.
The expected signs of the coeffi cients vary by the purpose while the expected
sign for Term is positive.
The last group of explanatory variables includes the lead arranger char-
acteristics Z. Ivashina (2009) calculates the lead arranger’s ranking based on
its market share using the number of deals. The idea behind the market share
is that lead arrangers in general are forced to retain a larger share of the loan
when the borrower is more opaque. In that case more intense screening and
monitoring is required so that participants may only be willing to buy a share
of the loan if the lead arranger has enough own money at stake to ensure
that she is fulfilling her duties diligently. However, this effect may be less
pronounced when the lead arranger has a more established reputation and
may therefore result in lower spreads for these lead arrangers. Consequently,
the expected sign for Lead Ranking is positive, given that the largest lead
arranger is ranked number one, the second largest is ranked number two and
so forth. One drawback of this ranking is that the distance between two
neighboring arrangers is always the same (namely one rank) while in reality
the distance between them (in terms of market share) may differ. Another
problem is that the ranking may not be informative if several banks did not
arrange a deal in the year before. Therefore, I also employ Sufi’s (2007)
specification, in which he calculates the market share based on the overall
amount a lead bank arranged in the previous year. Based on the previous
reasoning, the expected sign for Lead Reputation is negative. A summary of
the variable description is also presented in Table 1.
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4.4.1 A Brief Discussion of the Aggressiveness
Measure
Before I turn to the empirical results, a brief discussion of the aggressiveness
measure is in order. In principle, this measure can be applied to any bank as
long as it can be assured that the bank has active control over the pricing of
the loan. In the context of the syndicated loan market, this seems to be the
case only for the lead arranger banks, since they can actively negotiate the
terms of the deal. Participant banks on the other hand only have the choice
whether to participate or not and quite often they feel pressured to do so in
order to prevent damages to the relationship with the borrower. Therefore,
in this paper I apply this methodology only to lead arranger banks. Outside
the syndicated loan market, this methodology could in principle be applied
whenever detailed data on the loans are available.
Aggressiveness is defined as the residual of a regression of the all-in spread
on borrower and loan characteristics. It represents the part of the loan spread
that cannot be explained by borrower or loan characteristics but instead by
a bank’s characteristics and behavior. Examples include, for example, bank
credit supply conditions, the general bank strategy, and its risk appetite. In
principle it is possible that aggressiveness is also related to unobserved bor-
rower characteristics. For example, for all given observable characteristics
a borrower may be more or less risky. In this paper it is less of a concern
since I aggregate the estimated residuals at the bank level so that idiosyn-
cratic unobservable risks should cancel out. One might still object that it is
also possible that there is a systematic shift in risk if, for example, a whole
industry becomes riskier. I at least partially control for this by including in-
dustry and country dummies in the estimation of the residual. The potential
remainder is simply included in the residual although it may not represent
an active choice variable of a bank.
Although aggressiveness may include a bank’s risk appetite, it should, in
general, differ from a bank’s riskiness, which is often used as a key variable in
the regulatory and supervisory process. For example, a bank with a growing
risk appetite may decide to lend more to lower rated companies or at longer
maturities. Bank aggressiveness, however, does not need to change in that
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case. Alternatively, a bank’s aggressiveness may change even when the risk
characteristics of the loan portfolio remain the same. It is therefore a different
dimension of bank behavior. This dimension may be relevant to regulators
and supervisors since a change in aggressiveness could result in changes in
profitability even when the risk profile remains unchanged. Changes in prof-
itability, in turn, can affect the overall soundness of the banking system and
thus have real economic consequences as the latest financial crisis has recently
shown.
This also highlights the need to examine potential differences in aggress-
iveness among banks and over time, and to understand the potential determ-
inants of these differences at the bank level. Therefore, only borrower, loan,
and loan market (more precisely, the lead arranger’s position in the market)
information are included in the estimation of the aggressiveness measure.
This allows me to examine the residual over time and across banks. In or-
der to understand the potential determinants of aggressiveness at the bank
level, bank specific information is introduced in section 4.6.3. This two step
approach (first estimating the aggressiveness measure and then relating it to
bank specific information) implies that the results are biased against finding
significance of bank specific information. It thus makes significant results
more credible, which is important when supervisors and regulators want to
use this information. Moreover, the two step procedure allows me to first
estimate the aggressiveness and then check if it is related to future changes
in bank characteristics, hence acting as a leading indicator without interpret-
ing the results in a causal way. This might not be possible in the one step
setting where I would control for balance sheet characteristics already in the
estimation of the aggressiveness measure.
Another argument in favor of the two step method is that it ensures
consistency in the methodology across all explored dimensions including the
investigation of loans with more than one lead arranger, which is something
that has not been done in this paper but may be the subject of future re-
search. When using the one step method on loans with, for example, two
lead arrangers the following problem arises. Once you want to include bank
specific characteristics you either need to somehow average the characterist-
ics from both banks or you need to double the observation in order to include
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the variables for each bank once. In the former case the method of averaging
may influence the results or the whole exercise of averaging may not yield
reasonable figures. In the latter case, you have to increase the number of
observations (double in the case of two lead arrangers, triple for three lead
arrangers and so forth) although they are not independent of each other,
which may make statistical inferences problematic.
Note, that aggressiveness could be related to loan volume as less aggress-
iveness may be related to negative loan growth. However, a situation could
also exist in which overall loan volume is constant (due to, for instance, rela-
tionship commitments) but a bank is adjusting the price at which it is willing
to take that type of risk. This may not be captured by loan volume nor by
risk characteristics (as they are not changed). And even if the risk charac-
teristics did change, it would take some time to show up in a bank’s balance
sheet. Hence, this measure of bank aggressiveness may capture changes in
bank behavior more timely than balance sheet information. In addition, note
that the proposed aggressiveness measure could also be related to the all-in
spread, as more aggression may result in lower spreads. However, just as with
loan volume, this need not be the case. This time, it need not be if other
characteristics change, too. In that case the all-in spread may stay constant
while other observable characteristics worsen, making the bank effectively
more aggressive. Therefore, this measure of aggression may complement in-
formation obtained purely from loan volume or prices.
One potential objection against this aggressiveness approach is that it
only works for large banks that are active in the syndicated loan market.
Although this paper focuses on the syndicated loan market in particular,
the aggressiveness measure could also be calculated for other loan categories
as long as the supervisor or regulator can ensure access to timely updated
information about the relevant loan category. This may widen the range of
applicability substantially. However, even if it were only applicable to large
banks active in the syndicated loan market the proposed measure would still
be of value since these large banks are typically the ones that are systemically
relevant.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper that attempts to investigate this
residual of the syndicated loan spread more in detail. Esty and Megginson
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(2003) and, inspired by it, De Haas and van Horen (2010) use this residual
already but instead of investigating the residual itself more in detail, they
only use it as a control variable and call it "loan pricing residual" and "loan
residual risk", respectively. In my view, the interpretation of the residual as
the loan residual risk is only valid if the markets are perfectly competitive.
Once there exist some frictions like, for example, asymmetric information,
the residual may not only reflect residual risk. Therefore, I prefer the inter-
pretation of aggressiveness in a sense of willingness to make a particular loan.
This willingness certainly depends on risk characteristics, too, but is not re-
stricted to that. For instance, diversification motives and strategic changes
in the lending policy may also play a role.
Another paper that investigates variations in bank loan pricing is Cer-
queiro et al. (2007). It examines how banks use "discretion" in their loan
rate setting process. In essence, the authors employ a heteroscedastic regres-
sion model in which the residual variance is allowed to depend on the level of
the explanatory variables. The difference to my aggressiveness approach is
that in Cerqueiro et al. (2007) a larger variance (the squared residual) is seen
as more discretion and a small variance is interpreted as little discretion, be-
cause the loan pricing follows observable characteristics ("rules"). Hence, for
the individual residual only the distance to the mean residual (which should
be equal to zero) matters, as this determines the size of the variance. In my
approach, not only the distance to the mean matters but also the sign of
the residual. Thus, the exact location of the residual relative to the overall
distribution is of interest. To illustrate the differences, consider two loans
with the same residual variance. In Cerqueiro et al. (2007) these two loans
exhibit the same level of discretion and are thus not distinguishable. In my
approach, these two loans can be based on an identical level of bank aggress-
iveness if the residual is identical, or they can be based on different levels of
bank aggressiveness if the absolute value of the residual is the same but not
its sign. If the variance of both loans is very high, the discretion is very high
but the level of aggressiveness could differ substantially. Consequently, my
approach is able to examine the nature of the discretion more in detail while
Cerqueiro et al. (2007) can only detect the presence of discretion.
Note, that Cerqueiro et al. (2007) also attempt to investigate the ex-
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treme residuals a bit more in detail but that they are only able to draw a few
conclusions since their remaining results are too noisy. Their approach is as
follows. First they create two dummies, Rip-off and Bargain, that indicate
large deviations (more than one standard deviation) from the mean. Next,
they estimate logit regressions of these two dummies on the same explanatory
variables they have used in the discretion estimation. Their results suggest
that small, opaque firms are being subsidized while firms with a bad fiscal
track record face a mark-up in their loan spreads. The differences to my ap-
proach are twofold. First, by relying on the binary nature of their dependent
variables, they disregard all the variation that occurs within the two categor-
ies. Instead, my approach uses all the distributional information to analyze
the variations in the residual. Second, they attempt to explain the dummies
with the same variables that they already used to estimate the dummies. My
approach, on the other hand, introduces bank-specific variables in the second
step only.
Lastly, let me relate my approach of aggressiveness in the loan pricing to a
recent paper by Mason et al. (2009) that is concerned with what the authors
call "business aggression". Mason et al. (2009) use high ex-post write-downs
during the recent financial crisis to identify banks with "reckless" business
aggression and examine whether this business aggression contributed to the
recent credit crisis. Their hypothesis is that "reckless" banks make loans with
fewer covenants than banks with less aggression. In addition, they assume
that cov-light loans have a lower probability of default (PD) but a higher loss
given default (LGD), because loans with more covenants are likely to violate
one of the covenants earlier (higher PD) but in that case the repayment
share is also likely to be higher (lower LGD). The authors acknowledge that
in normal economic times it is diffi cult to distinguish the level of aggression
since a certain level of losses can be the result of either high PDs combined
with low LGDs or the other way around. However, during the financial
crisis the covenants would no longer make a difference so that both covenant
and cov-light loans failed. In this particular situation, banks with a high
level of aggression and thus with a lot of cov-light loans suffered more losses,
which helps the authors to identify banks with a high level of aggression.
Their findings suggest that aggressive banks were not different from other
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banks in the period 1995 to 2001 but that they reduced covenants in the
"loose" period of 2001 to 2006 substantially. There are various differences
between the Mason et al. (2009) approach and mine. First, their definition
of aggression focuses only on the number of covenants and no other deal
characteristics. Second, their approach needs to identify losses in extreme
situations ex-post in order to identify aggressive banks. My approach, on
the other hand, can be applied also in normal times and does not need to
wait for accounting losses to materialize. In fact, I show in the empirical
section below that my measure of aggressiveness can actually be used as a
leading indicator for changes in the loan book of a bank.
4.5 Data
The syndicated loan data is obtained from the Reuters LPC Dealscan data-
base, which offers an extensive coverage of syndicated loans around the world.
In particular, it contains detailed information on the contract terms, the
members of the syndicate and the borrower(s). Reuters LPC collects data
primarily from the attachments on SEC filings, publications from major
banks, and the financial press8. The full Dealscan database contains 111530
observations from the year 1982 to the beginning of 2010 where data on the
all-in spread, loan amount and lead arranger is available. However, since one
syndicated loan can have several tranches, there are, in fact, only 72649 loan
deals. 66.1% of these deals contain only one tranche, while 21.4% contain
two and 12.5% contain three or more tranches.
While these tranches may differ in various characteristics, such as the loan
amount, spread, and maturity (and other characteristics), I cannot treat
the various tranches of one syndicated loan as independent observations.
As Sufi (2007) notes, this is because the actual syndicated loan contract is
drafted at the deal level so that only one contract exists, in which all lenders
and covenants are listed together. Moreover, all lenders are chosen on the
tranches collectively, not independently. If one treated the observations as
independent, the resulting standard errors were improperly small. Following
8For more information on the Dealscan database see, for example, Ivashina (2009), Sufi
(2007), and Carey, Post, and Sharpe (1998).
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Ivashina (2009), I focus on the largest tranche of each deal.
I drop observations which are in some sense abnormal, like, for example,
bilateral deals and club deals (2913)9 and, following De Haas and van Horen
(2010), loans to government entities (464). Similarly, I follow Ivashina (2009)
in dropping loans to regulated (2015) and financial industries (8470), and
loans, which are not completed yet (1609).
I also drop 11679 observations with multiple lead arrangers to simplify
the interpretation of the aggressiveness measure. In the case of multiple lead
arrangers, the obtained measure of aggressiveness represents an average of
the aggressiveness of all lead arrangers. However, the exact aggressiveness
of a lead arranger may differ from that average given that different lead ar-
rangers can have different bargaining power and functions (see, for example
Sufi (2007)) within the syndicate. To make sure that the measured aggress-
iveness is really the one desired by the lead arranger, I decided to focus on
observations with only one lead arranger.
In addition, I drop observations before the year 1987 and for the year 2010
since Dealscan contains only 79 loans for the years 1982 to 1986 together and
only four for 2010. Finally, I follow Sufi(2007) and drop all deals where none
of the top 100 lead arrangers is involved (5213) to make the collection of lead
arranger specific data manageable. The final sample therefore contains 40203
observations over the years 1987 to 2009.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the estim-
ation of the lead arrangers’aggressiveness. The dependent variable is the
all-in spread drawn and it has a mean of 207 basis points and a median of
200 basis points. Among the independent variables the natural logarithm of
sales has a mean of 21.24 and a median of 19.49, which translates into $1,680
million and $291 million, respectively. Sales are not reported in roughly one
third of the cases so that I also include a dummy if the sales are not repor-
ted. Borrowers have a ticker symbol in 40 percent of the cases, a rating in 23
percent of the cases but a commercial paper rating in only 6 percent of the
cases. Furthermore, roughly 28 percent of the borrowers obtained a syndic-
ated loan in the previous three years and on average the borrowers had 1.4
9De Haas and van Horen (2010) note that club deals are special as they lack the typical
two tier structure.
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syndicated loans before. The largest tranche of the deal (which I consider in
this paper) is secured in 38 percent of the cases, has financial covenants in
29 percent and performance pricing in 22 percent of the cases, and is a term
loan in 32 percent of the cases. The mean log of the tranche amount is 19
with a median of 18.13, which translates into $179 million and $75 million,
respectively. The average number of facilities of the whole deal is 1.48 with
a median of one.
Among the chosen maturities the category two to five years is the pre-
ferred choice in 53 percent of the cases, followed by the omitted category
(less than two years and no revolver or a revolver with more than one and
less than two years) with 23 percent, maturities longer than five years with
17 percent, and revolvers with less than one year maturity in seven percent
of the cases. Within the category loan purpose, general corporate purposes
are stated most often (49 percent), followed by the omitted category (17 per-
cent), debt repayment (16 percent), acquisitions (13 percent), and backup
lines (4 percent). The information on the lead ranking is left out as it is
naturally skewed to the left since the number one lead arranger, by defini-
tion, has the most deals arranged. Finally, the lead reputation, defined as
the market share (based on the total amount arranged) of the previous year
has a mean of 7 percent and a median of three percent.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Estimating Aggressiveness
To estimate banks’aggressiveness in the syndicated loan market, I estimate
equation (4.1) and take the residuals as the banks’aggressiveness. The results
of the regression are shown in Table 3. Note that I added two dummies,
one for cases in which the sales were not reported and one for cases, in
which information whether a loan is secured or unsecured was not available.
In general, most of the coeffi cients are significant with the expected signs.
Higher sales and a ticker symbol reduce the spread of a syndicated loan as
they represent lower information asymmetries. A rating worse than BBB
tends to increase the spread while the opposite is true for ratings better
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than BBB. Similarly, not having a rating increases the spread but having a
commercial paper rating reduces it. While a previous interaction between
lead arranger and borrower slightly reduces the spread, the sign for borrower
reputation is contrary to the expectation. Instead of reducing the spread
it tends to slightly increase the spread. A potential explanation for this
might be correlation with, for example, Previous Relationship. In roughly
80% of the deals the borrower had at most two previous loans and if those
occurred in the last three years, this might also be captured by the Previous
Relationship dummy. The signs of the remaining variables are in accordance
with the theoretical expectations from Table 1. A secured loan tends to have
higher spreads than an unsecured loan and performance pricing, a larger
amount, a longer maturity, and a better lead reputation tend to decrease
the spread. Term loans and loans with more facilities, on the other hand,
are associated with higher spreads. Only financial covenants tend to have
no influence on the spread and short maturities seem to be no different than
maturities between one and two years. All in all, the coeffi cients and their
signs seem reasonable so that I can now turn to the actual aggressiveness
measure.
4.6.2 Does Aggressiveness differ among Banks?
To answer the question whether aggressiveness differs among banks, several
dimensions are investigated. As a start, I calculate the average aggressive-
ness per bank across all years of existence by weighting each observation by
its tranche amount. Figure 1 shows the averages for the top 100 lead ar-
rangers. The number one in the ranking is defined as the lead arranger that
has arranged the largest number of deals during the entire sample period.
One can see in Figure 1 that the average aggressiveness varies considerably
among the banks without having too many outliers. Keeping in mind that
negative values imply more aggressiveness (lower spreads), the figure seems
to suggest a slightly downward sloping trend. This suggests that the largest
lead arrangers can afford to be less aggressive. In unreported results, I test
this more formally by regressing the average aggressiveness of each lead ar-
ranger upon its rank. The coeffi cient of the rank is negative but insignificant
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so that I cannot conclude that better ranked lead arrangers are on average
less aggressive than lower ranked competitors.
Next, the individual bank aggressiveness is investigated over time. Since
plotting the yearly aggressiveness of all 100 lead arrangers over time in one
graph is not very instructive, I focus here on the top 10 lead arrangers.
Again, the top 10 lead arrangers are defined as those 10 banks that arranged
the largest number of deals across the entire sample period. One can see
in Figure 2 that there are persistent differences in aggressiveness over time
even among the top 10. For example, number three and ten among the top
10 lead arrangers differ in their aggressiveness by more than 50 basis points
for most years of the sample. This suggests that the findings in Figure
1 are not due to one or two outlier years but rather the result of bank-
specific differences that are quite persistent over time. Moreover, it can be
seen that the aggressiveness differences are larger in the first part of the
sample, then they tend to converge a bit around the year 1999 before they
widen slightly in the following years and increase substantially in the last
years of the sample. The first part could be explained by a lower number of
observations. However, since the number of observations is lower in the first
years for all top 10 lead arrangers and there does not seem to be a systematic
difference between banks with large swings and banks with small swings a
lower number of observations alone cannot explain the larger swings in the
beginning.
Another potential explanation is idiosyncratic pricing. It is possible that
banks needed some time to fine-tune their pricing. However, in this case we
should observe a steady decline in the swings and in the standard deviation of
the yearly aggressiveness measure. As one can see in Figure 3, this is not fully
true. In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s the standard deviations of the top
10 lead arrangers do converge among each other but decline only somewhat
in absolute value. In addition, after 1999 their dispersion and levels seem to
increase again, especially after 2007. The latter observation hints to another
candidate, namely business cycle movements. In both figures, there is a
substantial increase in the years 2008 and 2009, implying that lead arrangers
became less aggressive on average but also that their pricing became more
dispersed within a bank. However, when the time series behavior of Figures
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2 and 3 is compared with the GDP growth in Figure 4 one has to conclude
that for most years of the sample the U.S. GDP growth is not related to the
levels and dispersion of the lead arranger aggressiveness measure. Only in the
last two years, where the U.S. experienced a severe recession, the U.S. GDP
growth is negatively correlated with the levels and standard deviations of the
top 10 lead arranger aggressiveness. This implies that during the recession
the banks become substantially less aggressive and more discriminative in
their pricing but this holds only for the most severe recession since the great
depression. Overall, one has to conclude that there may be several factors
that explain the variation of the top 10 lead arranger aggressiveness over
time.
In order to rule out that the findings only hold for the top 10 lead ar-
rangers, I repeat the analysis for the whole sample. In this case, however, I
cannot look at individual lead arrangers anymore but have to look at the av-
erage aggressiveness of all banks over time. Since the aggressiveness measure
averaged over the whole sample should be zero by construction, the average
across all banks per year will be closer to zero already. Nevertheless it may
be possible to detect some trends over time. Figure 4 plots the average yearly
aggressiveness of all banks and the U.S. GDP growth rate over time while
Figure 5 repeats the exercise for the standard deviation of the yearly aggress-
iveness of all banks. In general, the results from the top 10 lead arrangers
are confirmed for the whole sample. Across the largest part of the sample
the average yearly aggressiveness of all banks does not seem to be related
to the U.S. business cycle. Only in the last two years a strong negative re-
lationship is visible. The same holds true for the standard deviation of the
yearly aggressiveness of all banks. In the early years the standard deviation
declines irrespective of the business cycle up until the year 2000. Afterwards,
the standard deviation seems to be more related to the U.S. GDP growth
since a decline in economic activity is associated with a rise in the standard
deviation. Hence, also for the whole sample, it seems that banks become
substantially less aggressive and more discriminative in their pricing during
the recent recession.
Another important dimension is the time series behavior of the most and
least aggressive lead arrangers. Figure 6 depicts the average yearly aggress-
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iveness of the three most and three least aggressive lead arrangers over time.
For that, each year the three most and least aggressive leads are determined.
This method is preferred to one where the three most and least aggressive
leads are determined at the beginning and then followed over time as they
might have changed their business behavior, merged or simply ceased to exist.
Instead, this method follows the industry’s most extreme actors over time.
One can see in Figure 6 that there is a clear difference between the three
most and three least aggressive banks at any point in time. In addition, this
difference seems to vary over time in a similar fashion as the behavior of the
top 10 lead arrangers over time. During the first half of the sample it tends to
shrink until the year 1999 while afterwards it widens somewhat. Particularly
the last two years are distinctive again, as the difference between the most
and least aggressive actors widens substantially. Moreover, one can observe
that the dispersion within the least aggressive lead arrangers is larger than
among the most aggressive lead arrangers. This seems to be plausible as
the most aggressive banks operate at the frontier of what is possible, which
implies that competition forces the lead arrangers to be close to each other.
For the least aggressive banks on the other side there is no clear frontier so
that the dispersion may be larger.
In order to make sure that these observations do not hold only for the
three most extreme lead arrangers on each side, I repeat this exercise for
the five and ten most and least aggressive lead arrangers. To maintain the
clarity of the figure, I take the average yearly aggressiveness of the five and ten
most and least aggressive lead arrangers, respectively. The results are shown
in Figure 7. The difference between the ten most and ten least aggressive
lead arrangers is, as expected, even larger than among selected members
of the top 10 lead arrangers. However, it is somewhat smaller than the
difference between the three (and five) most and least aggressive lead banks.
Across most years of the sample, it varies about 150 basis points or more. In
addition, the previously described trends are clearly visible, too. In the first
half the difference between the most and least aggressive banks shrinks until
the year 1999, afterwards it tends to increase a bit again, and the impact of
the recession in the last years is again very visible.
The analysis of the top 10 lead arrangers, all lead arrangers, and the most
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and least aggressive lead arrangers presents one consistent picture. Through-
out the sample there is considerable variation of aggressiveness over time and
among banks. Especially the variation among banks suggest that seemly
identical borrowers can face different loan spreads depending on the aggress-
iveness of the bank. This implies a certain degree of allocative ineffi ciency
given that the differences can be as large as 50 basis points even among the
top 10 lead arrangers. In addition to the variation among banks, there exists
also considerable variation over time, which cannot be attributed to a single
factor. While idiosyncratic pricing may explain the early years of the sample,
other factors, like for example, the business cycle play a role in the later years
and especially in the big recession at the end of the sample. However, there
may also be bank-specific factors at play, which is why in the next section, I
analyze bank-specific determinants more in detail.
4.6.3 Determinants of Aggressiveness
The question whether there exists a link between a lead arranger’s aggress-
iveness and its bank-specific characteristics is of interest for several reasons.
First, it is in general important to understand pricing factors of loans, es-
pecially for policy makers and supervisors, since a proper understanding of,
for instance, changes in loan spreads helps to determine the correct policy
reaction. It also facilitates the monitoring of the financial system and helps
to react in a timely fashion. Second, knowledge about such a link may be
important for regulation in particular. If, for example, a bank’s aggressive-
ness is related to other risk taking channels like, for instance, leverage, then
regulating leverage alone might not have the desired effect. In addition, it
may be possible that banks with access to, for instance, securitization or de-
rivatives markets may act more aggressive in the syndicated loan market. In
that case, tightening the regulating of the securitization or derivatives mar-
kets may have an economic impact on the syndicated loan market, which in
turn may make loans more expensive and hence have an effect on economic
activity.
In this section I analyze potential determinants of aggressiveness, that is,
bank-specific characteristics that influence a lead arranger’s aggressiveness.
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The analysis is done by using a fixed effects panel data approach with stand-
ard errors clustered at the bank level. In particular, I regress the average
yearly aggressiveness per bank εi,t upon lagged yearly bank characteristics
Wi,t−1:
εi,t = δ + ηWi,t−1 + θi + µi,t, (4.2)
while including bank fixed effects. For the former variable I take the
estimates obtained in section (4.6.1). The bank-specific characteristics, how-
ever, are not reported in the Dealscan database so that I first need to match
the top 100 lead arrangers from Dealscan with the Bankscope database. The
latter offers a broad coverage of harmonized financial data for financial in-
stitutions around the world. Although not always as detailed as the inform-
ation from a national supervisor, Bankscope represents a good mix between
detailed information and global coverage. Based on the Bankscope database,
I was able to identify in total 85 entities, among which also a few newly
founded ones as a result of a merger. I treat two merged firms as a new en-
tity because it cannot be guaranteed that the past business style, and hence
the past aggressiveness, will be continued after the merger. Moreover, I drop
banks with less than four years of data. In addition, some banks which ceased
to exist in the early period of my sample can still be found in Bankscope but
have no longer detailed balance sheet information available. Because of these
two facts, I end up with 69 lead arrangers for which I have at least four years
of data. Note, however, that in some cases the number of lead arrangers falls
even further since some balance sheet variables are not reported for all lead
arrangers.
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the selected balance sheet vari-
ables. The mean of total assets is roughly $161 billion with a median of
$190 billion, which translates into 11.99 and 12.16 when taking logs of total
assets. The fact that the median is actually higher suggests that there are a
few small banks in the sample. However, in unreported results, I exclude the
small banks such that the mean and the median are roughly equal and find
that this does not influence the results shown below. The ratios debt to total
assets and loans to total assets have a mean of 0.94 and 0.53, respectively,
and very similar medians. Off-balance sheet items as a share of total assets
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have a mean of 0.14, which seems to be driven by a few banks with larger
shares since the median is only 0.09. A similar observation can be made
when looking at the ratio liquid assets to total assets, whose mean is 0.12
but whose median is only 0.09. The return on assets have a mean and median
that are close to each other with 0.89 and 0.91 percent, respectively. Among
the loan quality proxies, the loan loss provisions are on average 0.65 percent
of total loans and the loan loss reserves are 2 percent of total loans. The
share of nonperforming loans to total loans is on average 1.8 percent, which
seems to be driven by a few observations with larger shares as the median
is only 1.1 percent. On the liabilities’side, banks finance themselves mostly
with short term funding, which makes up on average 78.6 percent of total
debt. Among the short term funding, nondeposits make up only 14 percent
on average. Lastly, the banks in the sample have a mean tier 1 capital ratio
of 8.4 percent with a median of 8.2 percent.
The results from the regression in equation (4.2) are shown in Table 5.
In the first column the average yearly aggressiveness is regressed upon three
explanatory variables, namely size, leverage and the loan-to-asset ratio. In
the following columns, various other characteristics are added and in the last
columns all variables are included with the exception of the ratio nonper-
forming loans to loans since it is highly correlated with the ratio loan loss
reserves to loans.
Across all columns one can observe that size is positively related to the
aggressiveness measure εi,t. Remembering that a more positive value of εi,t
implies less aggressiveness, this suggests that larger banks tend to be less
aggressive. The debt to asset ratio, on the other hand, is in most cases
negatively related to the aggressiveness measure. This, however, is most
likely not a causal relationship but instead both variables seem to be driven
by a third factor, namely the overall risk appetite. In that case, a bank with
a high overall risk appetite chooses a high leverage ratio and an aggressive
pricing approach. The third permanent explanatory variable, the loan-to-
asset ratio, is not related to aggressiveness. In unreported results,I also test
the lagged loan growth instead of the lagged loan levels but they, too, are
insignificant.
Columns two and three reveal that off-balance sheet items as a ratio of
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total assets, the return on average assets, and liquid asset to total assets are
not related to aggressiveness. Columns four to eight investigate loan quality
proxies a bit more in detail. They show that especially loan loss provisions
as a share of total loans are significantly related to aggressiveness, both alone
and in combination with loan loss reserves or nonperforming loans. Higher
provisions the year before suggest a less aggressive behavior in the current
year. This is one of the central results of the paper as it shows that when
problems in the loan book arise, banks do not just reduce quantity but also
adjust the pricing. The latter may occur when the bank is committed to
providing a certain amount of capital but both may actually also go hand
in hand. In terms of economic significance, a coeffi cient of 1200 implies
an increase in the spreads (lower aggressiveness) of roughly 7 basis points
when the ratio loan loss provisions to total loans increases by one standard
deviation and all other variables are kept constant. Given that these 7 basis
points are the result of only one factor, namely the loan loss provisions, this
increase seems to be meaningful.
The next loan quality proxy, the loan loss reserves as a share of total
loans, is insignificant. This is not unreasonable since the provisions are a
flow variable and the reserves a stock variable. The flow variable therefore
represents the recent changes during the last year while the stock variable
is a summary of all past events, among which some may cancel each other
out. In addition, the stock variable is influenced by new inflows (through
provisions) but also through outflows (through charge-offs). A zero change
in the reserves can hence be the result of no provisions and no charge-offs or
large provisions and charge-offs of equal size.
For these reasons, I also test an alternative to the loan loss reserves,
namely the share of nonperforming loans to total loans. Columns six and
eight reveal that they are insignificant alone and in combination with the
loan loss provisions. The fact that only the loan loss provisions are signi-
ficant makes intuitively sense because they are the first indicator showing
that something is wrong while others (loan loss reserves and nonperforming
loans) take more time to react. Hence, when provisions increase a bank may
react by being less aggressive. This may take less time than the time it
takes for nonperforming loans to change, for example. Theoretically higher
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lags in variables like, for instance, loan loss reserves or nonperforming loans
may reveal a significant relationship but in this case there may be more con-
founding effects in the meantime. In addition, the aggressiveness measure
should react relatively quickly to changes in a bank policy, so that lag of one
year may not be long enough while a lag of two years may already be too
long. Therefore, I do not investigate higher lags further. Instead, I turn to
potential determinants on the liabilities’side. Columns nine and ten show
that neither the share of short term funding to total debt nor the share of
nondeposit funding to short term funding is significant at conventional levels.
It implies that the liabilities structure does not seem to influence a bank’s
aggressiveness.
The last column includes all tested variables at once, except for the ratio
nonperforming loans to loans since it is highly correlated with the ratio loan
loss reserves to loans. The results do not change much. Larger banks still
seem to be less aggressive although the significance of size declines somewhat.
Higher leverage and more aggressiveness continue to be significantly related,
too. The loan loss provisions as a share of total loans continue to be signi-
ficant at the 5% level and with a similar coeffi cient. All other explanatory
variables remain insignificant. Lastly, note that the number of banks varies
a bit as not all balance sheet variables are reported all the time. Additional
tests (not shown here), however, show that this does not influence the results.
The combined results suggest that bank specific factors form a large part
of the pricing residual so that one can speak of a bank’s aggressiveness in a
narrower sense. Unobserved borrower characteristics might only have an in-
fluence on the residual if they were systematic across a bank’s loan portfolio
and not just idiosyncratic to the specific loan. In that case, however, they
should be at least partially captured by the industry and country dummies in
the pricing regression. Moreover, in the second step, they should be capture
by the bank fixed effects, so that overall, their influence should be small. The
fact, that bank specific factors play a significant role in explaining aggress-
iveness while the general business cycle does not, supports the interpretation
of aggressiveness in a narrower, bank-specific sense.
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4.6.4 Aggressiveness as a Leading Indicator
This section addresses the question whether a bank’s aggressiveness can be
used as a leading indicator. More precisely, I analyze if lags of the aggress-
iveness measure are related to recent changes in certain balance sheet items.
Let me stress very clearly here, that I am not interpreting the results in a
causal way. In order to use the aggressiveness as a leading indicator it is
suffi cient that its lags are related to recent changes in the balance sheet vari-
ables even if both are driven by a third factor. Even in this case, using the
aggressiveness measure as a leading indicator is interesting for supervisory
and regulatory purposes. This is because the balance sheet information that
supervisors and regulators often rely on are reported with a delay as they are
reported only every 3 months. In addition, there is widespread evidence that
banks strategically manage the reporting of their loan loss data (Wall and
Koch (2000), and Hasan and Wall (2004)), delay the provisioning for loans
until cyclical downturns have already set in (Laeven and Majnoni (2003)),
and overstate the value of distressed assets (Huizinga and Laeven (2009)).
For these reasons it may be useful to have a leading indicator at hand that
informs the regulator or supervisor about potential changes in the balance
sheet of a bank in a more timely fashion.
The proposed aggressiveness measure should be a more timely indicator
since information about syndicated loans is published immediately after the
deal is closed through the league tables. As Ivashina (2009) notes, lead
arrangers have a strong incentive to publish this information as it serves as
a marketing tool. Therefore, it should be relatively quick and easy to collect
and update this information in an database and, in fact, this is exactly what
the Dealscan database does. In addition to having access to this database,
the aggressiveness measure itself should also be a timely indicator. Given
that changes in the aggressiveness measure represent changes in the pricing
behavior, this requirement should be satisfied, because the pricing of a loan
changes as quick as or even quicker than the loan volume. The latter situation
may occur if the bank has already informally committed itself to a certain
loan volume. However, even if the loan volume and the pricing changed with
the same pace, this information should still be more timely than the balance
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sheet information that is published every 3 months.
Table 6 reports the results for the regressions in which the one-year change
in the balance sheet variable is regressed upon three lags of the aggressiveness
measure. In addition, the level of the last year balance sheet variables is
included to control for mean reversion. It turns out that neither of the three
lags is significantly related to changes in bank size, the debt-to-asset ratio, the
loan-to-asset ratio, as well as the ratio short term funding to total debt. Since
the three lags may be correlated to each other, I also check (in unreported
results) each lag individually but the results remain unchanged. The return
on assets, however, seem to be significantly related with the one year lag of
aggressiveness. In a causal interpretation one could say that a bank that
has been less aggressive the year before experiences higher return on assets
now. Most likely, however, there is general effort to improve profitability
which expresses itself first in, among others, less aggressive pricing. After a
while the benefits can be seen in improved return on assets. Liquid assets
as a share of total assets, on the other hand, are significantly related to
the third lag of aggressiveness, suggesting that a bank that has been less
aggressive three years ago experienced a growing share of liquid assets in the
last year. A potential explanation for this may be a general switch in the
bank’s aggressiveness which leads first to less aggressive pricing and later on
to more liquid assets. A potential reason why the liquid assets may react
with a delay is that the bank may be committed to a certain loan volume
already and that it may take time for these commitments to fade out.
The next group of variables deals with the loan quality of a bank. The
loan loss provisions as a share of total loans are not significantly related
with either of the three lags. Again, in unreported results I tested each lag
individually but the results remain unchanged. The ratio of loan loss reserves
to total loans, however, is significantly related to the first and third lag of
aggressiveness. The reason why the second lag is not statistically significant
may lie in some small collinearity issues among the lags because when testing
each lag alone (not reported here), the second lag turns significant at the 5%
level while the first lag is significant only at the 10% level. Thus, it seems that
banks that have been less aggressive over the last three years can also afford
to have declining loan loss reserves, which may be due to a general trend
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towards a more conservative banking approach. The ratio of nonperforming
loans to total loans is significantly related to the third lag of aggressiveness
at the 10% level. However, this result vanishes once each lag is investigated
individually so that I do not want to interpret this finding any further.
The last variable to consider is the Tier one capital ratio. The results
suggest that a bank that has been less aggressive over the last three years
also experiences an improving Tier one capital ratio, as the first and third
lag of aggressiveness is significant at the 5% level. Tested individually, the
second lag also turns significant but only at the 10% level. These findings
could be the result of a general move towards more conservatism under which
the syndicated loan pricing becomes less aggressive and the capital buffer is
improved. Finally, let me note that the level of the last year balance sheet
variable is always negative and significant, which confirms the expectation of
trends towards mean reversion.
Overall, the results suggest that the lagged aggressiveness of a bank is
related to changes in some key balance sheet items, including a meaningful
economic significance. As an example, take a decrease in aggressiveness of
one standard deviation (roughly 59 basis points) and multiply it with the
sum of the coeffi cients of the three lags of aggressiveness. When considering
the loan loss reserves as a share of total loans, this translates into a decrease
of this ratio of roughly 8.1%10. Similarly, for the Tier one capital ratio, this
translates into an improvement of the ratio of 4.7 %11. Given that these
changes stem only from the syndicated loan part of the loan portfolio, these
changes are economically meaningful. This is also of interest for a supervisor
or regulator as it suggests that the aggressiveness of bank can be used as
an leading indicator for coming changes in a bank’s balance sheet items like,
for instance, the share of loan loss reserves or the Tier one capital ratio.
Particularly in cases, where the supervisor requires a bank to improve its
capital position or to improve the quality of the loan book, the aggressiveness
measure might be helpful early information whether the bank follows suit
well before the taken measures materialize in the respective balance sheet
10The sum of all three coeffi cients is -0.00002951, which multiplied by 59 is roughly equal
to -0.00174. Evaluated at the mean loan loss reserves ratio (0.0215), this yields -0.081.
11The sum of all three coeffi cients is 0.00673, which multiplied by 59 is roughly equal to
0.39707. Evaluated at the mean Tier one capital ratio (8.5), this yields 0.0467.
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items. To further improve the informational value of the leading indicator
a supervisor or regulator could require banks to submit detailed data on
all loan categories. In addition, examining aggressiveness more in detail
in future research could also help to understand the interplay between risk
appetite and aggressiveness, and the interplay between quantity adjustments
and pricing aggressiveness in the loan market.
4.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the pricing behavior of large, international lead ar-
rangers in the syndicated loan market. In particular, it proposes to use the
residual of a pricing regression as a measure of a lead arranger’s aggress-
iveness. After regressing the all-in spread of a syndicated loan on borrower
characteristics, loan characteristics, and lead arranger characteristics, the
obtained residual is investigated across several dimensions.
Based on detailed information from the Reuters LPC Dealscan database
on 40203 syndicated loans for the years 1987 to 2009 I find that there is con-
siderable variation of aggressiveness over time and among banks. Especially
the variation among banks suggest that seemly identical borrowers can face
different loan spreads depending on the aggressiveness of the bank. This im-
plies a certain degree of allocative ineffi ciency given that the differences can
be as large as 50 basis points even among the top 10 lead arrangers while in
an effi cient outcome the difference should be zero. The time series variation
seems to be explained best by idiosyncratic pricing in the first half of the
sample. In the latter half, other factors seem to be more important. Busi-
ness cycle movements, however, do not seem to be related to the time series
variation as they only seem to influence it in the last years of the sample
when the recent economic recession hit the world economy.
Therefore, the paper examines bank-specific factors more in detail. For
this, I obtain bank-specific balance sheet information from the Bankscope
database and regress the average yearly aggressiveness per bank upon lagged
yearly bank characteristics. I find that especially loan loss provisions as a
share of total loans are significantly related to aggressiveness. Higher provi-
sions the year before suggest a less aggressive behavior in the current year.
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This result suggests that when problems in the loan book arise, banks do not
just reduce quantity but also adjust the pricing.
My findings also suggest that the aggressiveness measure can indicate
future changes in a bank’s condition, which makes it interesting for supervis-
ory and regulatory processes. Supervisors and regulators often have to rely
on bank-specific balance sheet information to inform themselves about the
condition of a bank. This balance sheet information, however, is typically
reported with a lag so that there may be informational value in having a
more timely update about the condition of a bank. A bank’s aggressiveness
seems to be one such more timely indicator because I find that less pricing
aggressiveness is related to increasing return on assets in the short run (one
year) and a lower share of loan loss reserves to total loans and a higher Tier
one capital ratio over the short and medium term (one to three years).
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4.8 Tables
Table 1: Definition and Expected Sign of Explanatory Variables
Variable Name Description Exp. Sign
Borrower Characteristics W
Sales ln(sales) of borrower —
Ticker dummy=1 if borrower has a ticker symbol —
Credit Ratings set of dummies: one for each Standard & Poor’s lower spreads for
senior debt rating, BBB is the omitted category better ratings
Not Rated dummy=1 if borrower is not rated +
CP Rating dummy=1 if borrower has a CP rating —
Previous Relationship dummy=1 if over the last 3 years the same lead —
arranged a loan for the same borrower
Borrower Reputation number of loans borrower obtained before —
Industry dummies at two-digit SIC level; N/A is the omitted varies
category
Country country dummies for the country of the borrower; different
USA is the omitted category
Loan Characteristics X
Secured dummy=1 if loan is secured +
Financial Covenants dummy=1 if financial covenants exist ambiguous
Performance Pricing dummy=1 if performance pricing exists ambiguous
Amount ln(amount) of the tranche ambiguous
Number of Facilities number of facilities that a deal has ambiguous
Short Maturity dummy=1 if loan is a revolver and has a maturity —
of less than 365 days
Intermed Maturity dummy=1 if maturity ranges from 2 - 5 years ambiguous
Long Maturity dummy=1 if maturity exceeds 5 years ambiguous
Term dummy=1 if loan is a term loan +
Loan Purpose 4 dummies for general corporate purposes, debt different
repayment, acquisition, and backup lines; all other
purposes form the omitted category
Lead Characteristics Z
Lead Ranking lead’s ranking based on market share using +
the number of deals (in previous year)
Lead Reputation market share (% of amounts) in previous year —
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Variables used in Aggressiveness Estimation
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 10th Perc. 50th Perc. 90th Perc.
Dependent Variable
All-in spread drawn 206.57 127.91 50.00 200.00 355.00
Independent Variables from Table 1
Sales 21.24 22.90 17.33 19.49 21.84
Ticker 0.40 0.49 0 0 1.00
Not Rated 0.77 0.42 0 1.00 1.00
CP Rating 0.06 0.24 0 0 0
Previous Relationship 0.28 0.45 0 0 1.00
Borrower Reputation 1.40 2.12 0 1.00 4.00
Secured 0.38 0.49 0 0 1.00
Financial Covenants 0.29 0.45 0 0 1.00
Performance Pricing 0.22 0.41 0 0 1.00
Amount 19.00 19.85 16.30 18.13 19.81
Number of Facilities 1.48 0.86 1.00 1.00 3.00
Short Maturity 0.07 0.26 0 0 0
Intermed Maturity 0.53 0.50 0 1.00 1.00
Long Maturity 0.17 0.37 0 0 1.00
Term 0.32 0.47 0 0 1.00
General Corporate Purpose 0.49 0.50 0 0 1.00
Debt Repayment 0.16 .037 0 0 1.00
Acquisitions 0.13 0.33 0 0 1.00
Backup Lines 0.04 0.19 0 0 0
Lead Reputation 0.07 0.08 0.001 0.03 0.19
Additional Information
Sales in $ mil. 1,680.00 8,860.00 33.70 291.00 3,040.00
Dummy No Sales Reported 0.35 0.48 0 0 1.00
Trancheamount in $ mil. 179.00 416.00 12.00 75.00 400.00
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Dummy S&P Rating = D 137.1***
(9.745)
Dummy S&P Rating = C 112.1**
(46.53)
Dummy S&P Rating = CC 158.4***
(27.98)
Dummy S&P Rating = CCC- 137.0***
(19.68)
Dummy S&P Rating = CCC 164.3***
(17.02)
Dummy S&P Rating = CCC+ 128.8***
(10.28)
Dummy S&P Rating = B- 95.08***
(6.617)
Dummy S&P Rating = B 72.92***
(4.946)
Dummy S&P Rating = B+ 64.23***
(3.901)
Dummy S&P Rating = BB- 43.26***
(3.762)
Dummy S&P Rating = BB 33.79***
(4.446)
Dummy S&P Rating = BB+ 28.79***
(4.165)
Dummy S&P Rating = BBB- 11.18***
(3.550)
Dummy S&P Rating = BBB+ -6.533*
(3.372)
Dummy S&P Rating = A- -16.04***
(3.413)
Dummy S&P Rating = A -25.02***
(3.401)
Dummy S&P Rating = A+ -29.44***
(4.309)
Dummy S&P Rating = AA- -22.25***
(5.002)
Dummy S&P Rating = AA -24.04***
(5.636)
Dummy S&P Rating = AA+ -42.85***
(9.860)
Dummy S&P Rating = AAA -28.07***
(7.645)
to be continued on next page





























Dummy Corporate Purposes -25.42***
(1.760)












The dependent variable is the all-in spread. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the
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Figure 3: Standard Deviation of Yearly Aggressiveness of
Top 10 Lead Arrangers
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Figure 4: Average Yearly Aggressiveness of all Lead Arrangers
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Figure 5: Standard Deviation of Yearly Aggressiveness of all Lead
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Figure 6: Yearly Aggressiveness of 3 Most and Least Aggressive
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Figure 7: Average Yearly Aggressiveness of 5 and 10 Most and
Least Aggressive Lead Arrangers over Time
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